Concurrent Remedies under RERA and Consumer Protection Act: Which is more effective?

“Real estate cannot be lost or stolen, nor can it be carried away. Purchased with common sense, paid for in full, and managed with reasonable care, it is about the safest investment in the world.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President                                       

By stating a quote said by the then-former U.S. President, we come to an understanding that owning a house that can be called your own is something that every individual dreams of. But, in most cases, the hurdles that a buyer has to overcome in achieving his dream lead to a lot of financial and mental distress. This distress can be caused by a variety of factors, the most common of which is fraud or cheating by unscrupulous builders and real estate agents. 

Hence, it is vital for a buyer to know about the various legal remedies at his disposal. Furthermore, it is crucial to understand which of the various legal remedies is the best approach. This article analyses the various legal recourses available and the forum that would best redress the buyers’ concerns.


The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016


RERA prescribes that the promoter shall not accept more than 10% (ten percent) of the total value of the real estate property before entering into the agreement for sale[1]. Further, the promoter is required to maintain a separate account with 70% (seventy percent) of the project funds. If the builder wants to modify the sanction plan under RERA, he requires the consent of two-thirds of the allottees. Under RERA, if any defect is brought to the attention of the promoter within a period of 5(five) years of handing over possession of the property, it shall be the duty of the promoter to rectify the defect[2].

RERA mandates that every real estate project be registered with the Real Estate Regulatory Authority. Without the registration of the real estate project, the promoter is not allowed to book, sell, or invite any person to purchase the project[3]. The applications must be filed addressing it to RERA with the necessary approvals from the local authorities, along with a development plan, proforma of all agreements that are signed by the company, details relating to contractors, real estate agents, architects, structural engineers, and other people concerned with the project, the details of the total carpet area of the apartments for sale in the project and a declaration signed with an affidavit confirming that it is free from all encumbrances. The following provisions bind the promoters as well as the real estate agents, providing the buyers with holistic protection.

Non-compliance or default with any of the aforementioned provisions resulted in a penalty of up to 10% (ten percent) of the total project cost and up to three years in prison[4]. The builders are also mandated to deposit 70% (seventy percent) of the project funds into a separate bank account to avoid the problem of builders diverting the funds of the project to another new project[5].

Grievances with regard to violations of the RERA can be filed on the RERA website, which acts as a single repository for all real estate project data and filing grievances[6]. The Real Estate regulatory authority has been prescribed a resolution time of 60 (sixty) days from the date of receipt of the application[7]. Further, the tribunal can hear appeals of the authority’s rulings within 60 (sixty) days[8]. Any appeal from the tribunal lies before the High Court and must be filed within a period of 60 (sixty) days of the decision. If there is a pending case before the Consumer Forum pertaining to the damages caused by the false advertisements and non-adherence to the project specification, approved plan, or failure to complete the project on the specified date, the case can be withdrawn and filed before the RERA adjudicating officer[9].


Overview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019


The Consumer Protection Act of 1986 and the new Act of 2019 were enacted to provide a simple and quick solution to consumers’ grievances against any deficiency in services or defect in goods. It is organised into three levels: the District Forum, the State Commission, and the National Commission (“Consumer Forum”). The Act defines “product seller,” and it includes a seller of immovable property only if that person is engaged in the construction of flats or homes or the sale of constructed homes[10]. As a result, builders and real estate agents are covered by the Act.

Under the said Act, only consumers can file a complaint, the term consumer is defined as a person who buys goods for consideration but doesn’t include a person who obtains such goods for commercial or resale purposes[11]. As a result, for the purposes of this article, those individuals are considered consumers who purchase a home or other property for personal use rather than commercial use.

In case of any defect or deficiency in the product or services, the consumer can file a complaint before the consumer forum within a period of 2 (two) years from the date on which the cause of action arose[12]. The consumer forums have a pecuniary limit. Hence, the District forum entertains complaints where the value of goods and services is not more than 1 crore rupees[13], State Commissions can entertain complaints that are above 1(one) crore and below 10 (ten) crore[14] and all complaints above 10 (ten) crores need to be filed with the National Commission[15].

Under the Act, the complaint is disposed of within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of the notice by the opposite parties[16]. The Act empowers the forums to grant compensation for loss incurred and punitive damages in appropriate cases.



Does RERA Reduce the Scope of CPA?


Before the enactment of the RERA, the Consumer Forum used to deal with matters relating to allottees. Following the enactment, the Consumer Forum’s jurisdiction to deal with allottee-related issues was not barred by the RERA. The standing committee also clarified that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forums was not taken away by the establishment of the Real Estate Tribunal. Further, the consumer also has the discretion to withdraw the complaint pending before the Consumer Forum, with the permission of the said forum, and file an application before the adjudicating officer under RERA[17].

In Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors.[18] the court referred to Section 71 of the RERA, which enables the consumer whose complaint is pending before the Consumer Forum to withdraw and go before the adjudicating officer. But the court held that the said provision has to be read with Section 88 of the said act, which explicitly states that the provision of RERA is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law. As a result, the court concluded that the complainant was not required to withdraw and transfer the complaint before the adjudicating officer. The complainant was empowered to simultaneously pursue remedies in both the forum on the strength of section 88 of the act.

The Apex Court, in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India and Ors [19], held that buyers of flats could avail concurrent remedies under Consumer Protection Act and RERA.

In M3M India Pvt Ltd v. Dinesh Sharma[20] the court considered the question of whether the proceedings before the consumer forum can commence after the commencement of the RERA. It was held that the remedies that are provided under RERA and the Consumer Protection Act are concurrent in nature and the jurisdiction of the commission or the Consumer Forum will not be ousted by RERA, specifically Section 79 of the Act.

In Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee[21] the Supreme Court held that even though the proceeding in the National Commission is a judicial proceeding, within the definition of the Civil Procedure Code it is not a Civil Court. Although the National Commission has the trappings of a Civil Court, it cannot be termed a Civil Court. Therefore, the bar that has been provided under Section 79 of RERA is not applicable to the Consumer Forum. This judgement was strongly relied on in the below-mentioned judgement.

Further, in M/s Imperia Structures Ltd v Anil Patni & Another[22] Section 79 of the RERA bars the civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter over which the Authority, the adjudicating officer or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by the RERA. The Apex Court held that it did not bar the complainant from filing complaints under the Consumer Protection Act. The section only imposes limitations on the Civil Courts’ ability to try issues that the adjudicating authority is empowered to entertain. As the Consumer Forum is not the same as the Civil Court the limitation does not apply.

Section 18 of the Act states that there is no bar to any aggrieved party from pursuing any other remedy that is available. Section 88 of the Act states that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other laws in force. However, on the contrary, Section 89 of the act provides that RERA shall have an overriding effect. The court cleared up the confusion by stating that even though Section 89 states that the Act shall have an overriding effect, the buyers can still approach the other forums under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, it is clear that parallel proceedings in different forums can exist. The court established that the aggrieved party could avail of parallel remedies under RERA as well as under the Consumer Protection Act.

A Comparative Study of RERA and Consumer Protection Act


The following are the requisite pointers that can be considered to determine which forum best serves the needs of homebuyers. 

Limitation Period

RERA has not provided any limitation period within which a complaint needs to be filed. However, according to the Consumer Protection Act, the complaint must be filed within two years of the cause of action. Hence, if the time period since the cause is more than 2 years, then the complainant can’t file a complaint before the Consumer Forum; the only remedy available at the complainant’s disposal is adjudication under the RERA.

Filing of a Complaint

Under RERA, any person who has been aggrieved by the builder or developer can file a complaint. However, under the Act, only a person who is a consumer can file a complaint. As a result, if a person does not fall within the definition of “consumer,” or if he has purchased a property for commercial purposes, or if any other person is dissatisfied with the developer, the only recourse is to approach RERA for adjudication.

Under RERA, the complaints are filed on the RERA website, and the process is simplified with minimal to no opportunity for modification because many States have distinct prescribed methods for filing complaints under RERA (including the format). However, under the Act, the complaint must be submitted in writing to the relevant authorities; it involves a complex procedure and includes documentation evidence; as a result, it appears to be a more time-consuming process. 

Pecuniary Limitations

The Act has prescribed pecuniary limitations based on the value of the property. Suppose the complainant’s property is above Rs. 1 crore, then he has to approach the State Commission and if its above Rs. 10 crores, he has to approach the National Commission for filing a complaint. Whereas RERA does not have any pecuniary limitations based on the value of the property. Hence, the complaint can be filed before the regulatory authority of the state in which the property is situated. Suppose the value of the property is more than Rs. 10 crores, then it is convenient for the buyer to adjudicate the dispute before RERA as the National Commission that is given jurisdiction under the Consumer Protection Act is situated in New Delhi.


The Act is empowered only to grant pecuniary compensation. It doesn’t enforce any preventive measures nor does it provide for any specific performance or imprisonment of the defaulting party. RERA, however, is exclusively empowered to provide certain non-compensatory remedies. Further, it is also empowered to impose imprisonment for up to 3 (three) years on the defaulting developers.  If the consumer is only seeking compensatory relief, then the consumer forum is the right forum to approach. But if the buyer is looking for a deterrent remedy, then filing a complaint before RERA is a better option.

Commercial Dispute

The Consumer Forum doesn’t deal with commercial issues. RERA has no such bar on the adjudication of commercial issues. Therefore, if an individual doesn’t fall within the definition of “Consumer” as defined under the Act, then the best and only recourse available in the hands of the buyer is to file a complaint under RERA.

Time Period for Disposal of Dispute

The resolution time specified under RERA is 60 (sixty) days[23]. Similarly, the Act states that every complaint shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible within a period of 3(three) months from the date of receiving notice from the other party[24].  However, in practice, disposing of matters in both forums takes much longer.




For regulating the “real estate” sector, the “Real Estate Regulatory Authority Act” is a landmark piece of legislation imposing time-bound obligations on promoters. Consumers’ or homebuyers’ rights are intended to be protected by ensuring fair play.

It is worth noting that RERA has not only been actively involved in maintaining transparency and accountability in the real estate sector, but has also assisted consumers and homebuyers in obtaining possession quickly and easily.

From the above analysis, we can deduce that RERA has finally ended up being an extension of the “Consumer Protection Act” which helps to address the growing need for transparency in favour of consumers as well as builders.

In light of the preceding comparative study and judicial pronouncements, we can safely conclude that it is entirely up to the allottee to choose either a concurrent remedy or a single forum to resolve his or her disputes. But it is a tedious process for a common man to simultaneously approach two different forums, the RERA or the Consumer Forum. 

The concurrent remedy has broadened the range of remedies available to home buyers. Both acts have their benefits and drawbacks in terms of resolving the buyers’ issues. The most effective forum for the buyer to approach for resolving his issue is highly dependent on the facts of the case and the remedy that the aggrieved party is seeking from the respective forum.

Concurrent Remedies under RERA and Consumer Protection Act: Which is more effective?


[1] Section 13 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[2] Section 14(3) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[3] Section 3 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[4] Section 59 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[5] Section 4(d) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[6] Section 31(1) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[7] Section 29(4) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[8] Section 44 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[9] Section 71 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[10] Section 1(37) of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[11] Section 1(7) of Consumer Protection Act, 201

[12] Section 69(1) of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[13] Section 34 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[14] Section 47 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[15] Section 58 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[16] 38(7) of of Consumer Protection Act, 2019

[17] Section 71 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[18] Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana CWP No. 38144 of 2018

[19] Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India and Ors 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1005

[20] M3M India Pvt Ltd v. Dinesh Sharma W.P.(C)43/2019

[21] Malay Kumar Ganguly vs. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 2010 SC 1162

[22] M/s Imperia Structures Ltd v Anil Patni & Another (Civil Appeal No. 3581-3590 of 2020)

[23] Section 29(4) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

[24] Section 38(7) of the of Consumer Protection Act, 2019


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The concurrent remedy has increased the scope of remedy that the home buyer can avail. Both acts have their benefits and drawbacks in terms of resolving the buyers’ issues. The most effective forum for the buyer to approach for resolving his/her issue is highly dependent on the facts of the case and the remedy that the aggrieved party is seeking from the respective forum.


Rectifying the Parallel Regime of RERA & WB-HIRA

The Supreme Court issued an important verdict on May 4, 2021, when it declared that the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulatory Act, 2017 (WB-HIRA) is “repugnant” to the Parliamentary law of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The state law created a “parallel regime” and encroached upon the identical Central law RERA, 2016, enacted the year before, and was in direct conflict with the central legislation by lacking necessary safeguards to protect consumers.


The Bench of Justices D. Y. Chandrachud and M. R. Shah in Writ Petition (C) No. 116 of 2019 [Forum for People’s Collective Efforts (FPCE) & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Anr.], in its 190-page judgment, struck down as unconstitutional West Bengal State law WB-HIRA meant to protect home buyers, enacted in 2017, a year after the Centre passed the RERA, stating that if Parliament had passed legislation, it was not open for states to enact similar statute.

Before Parliament enacted the RERA in 2016, state legislatures had enacted several laws to regulate the relationship between promoters and purchasers of real estate. Before the WB-HIRA, one of the laws the state legislature had enacted was the West Bengal (Regulation of Promotion of Construction and Transfer by Promoters) Act, 1993 (the “WB 1993 Act”). Upon receiving the assent of the President, the Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary on March 9, 1994.

In the State of West Bengal, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Bill, 2016 (the “RERA Bill 2016”) was introduced and draft rules under the RERA were framed on August 18, 2016, but no further progress was made in that regard. On August 16, 2017, the motion to pass the WB-HIRA Bill was adopted in the State Legislative Assembly. The Housing Industry Regulatory Authority was established under Section 20 of the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulatory Act, 2017 to regulate and promote the housing sector, to ensure the sale of plots, apartments or buildings, as the case may be, or sale of real estate projects in an efficient and transparent manner, to protect the interests of consumers in the real estate sector and to establish a mechanism for speedy dispute redressal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The State enactment received the assent of the Governor of West Bengal and was published in the Official Gazette on October 17, 2017, and came into effect from June 1, 2018.

The WB-HIRA repealed the WB 1993 Act. The remaining provisions of WB-HIRA were enforced by a notification dated March 29, 2018, issued by the Governor of the State of West Bengal in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of section 1 of WB-HIRA. Thereafter, on June 8, 2018, the State of West Bengal framed rules under WB-HIRA.

Because the Supreme Court declared the provisions of WB-HIRA to be invalid and struck them down in the current judgment, there will be no revival of the provisions of the WB 1993 Act, which were repealed upon the enactment of WB-HIRA, because the provisions of the WB 1993 Act are repugnant to the corresponding provisions of the RERA, which were impliedly repealed upon the enactment of the RERA in 2016.

The State Legislature has encroached upon the legislative authority of Parliament and this exercise conducted by the State Legislature is unconstitutional. The valuable safeguards introduced by Parliament in the public interest and certain remedies created by Parliament were absent in WB-HIRA.

Inconsistencies with RERA

RERA is a complete and exhaustive code which regulates the contractual relationship between a builder/promoter and a buyer/consumer in the real estate sector and provides remedial measures. RERA regulates the rights and obligations between promoters and buyers of real estate, in addition to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The enactment, in ensuring the actual transfer of property to the buyer, furthers the objects of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It provides for the enforcement of contracts through remedial measures that are in addition to the remedies provided in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and its successor legislation of 2019. RERA, in other words, is a special statute governing the real estate sector, encompassing rights and obligations found in different central enactments.

WB-HIRA covers the identical field of regulating the contractual behaviour of promoters and buyers in real estate projects. The State law is a ‘copy and paste’ replica of the central legislation (except for certain provisions which are inconsistent with RERA) and covers the field which is occupied by the central enactment. WB-HIRA is a “virtual replica” of the Central Law. A significant and even overwhelmingly large part of WB-HIRA overlaps with the provisions of RERA, but it does not complement the central law by fortifying the rights, obligations, and remedies.

The important provisions of WB-HIRA which are inconsistent with RERA are mentioned herein below:

  1. Force majeure events – The RERA restricts force majeure events to fire, cyclone, drought, flood, war, earthquake, or any other natural calamity that hinders the development of the projects, while WB-HIRA includes “any other circumstances as may be prescribed” as an added eventuality.
  2. Planning Area – The RERA specifies that only the projects that fall within the planning areas are subject to the RERA. According to Section 2 (zh) of the RERA, a “planning area” is a planning area or a development area, a local planning area, a regional development plan area, any other area specified as such by the appropriate government or any competent authority, while the WB-HIRA does not define the term “planning area”.
  3. Garage Area – RERA defines a garage as being ‘a place within a project having a roof and walls on three sides for parking any vehicle. It does not include uncovered parking spaces such as open parking areas. On the other hand, WB-HIRA has no such restrictions in defining garage or parking spaces and only mentions spaces as sanctioned by the competent authority.
  4. Compounding of Offences – If any person is found to have violated the RERA, they can be punished under the provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while WB-HIRA does not have provision for the compounding of offences.

Apart from the above, the subject of the provisions of the state enactment is identical, the content is identical. In essence and substance, WB-HIRA has enacted a parallel mechanism and parallel regime which the RERA already entails. In other words, the State legislature has enacted legislation on the same subject matter as the central enactment. Not only is the subject matter identical, but the statutory provisions of WB-HIRA are nearly identical to those of RERA.

WB-HIRA, since its enforcement in the State of West Bengal, would have been applied to building projects and implemented by the authorities constituted under the law in the state. In order to avoid uncertainty and disruption in respect of actions taken in the past, recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 was necessary. The Court, as such, exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 and gave effect to its judgment striking down the provisions of WB-HIRA prospective. The Court directed that the striking down of WB-HIRA will not affect the registrations, sanctions, and permissions previously granted under the legislation prior to the date of this judgment.

Down the Road

After the repeal of the WB-HIRA, the Government of West Bengal, Housing Department, by its Notification dated July 27, 2021, framed the West Bengal Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2021, and the rules will come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Thereafter, by another Notification dated July 29, 2021, the Government of West Bengal, Housing Department established an Authority known as the West Bengal Real Estate Regulatory Authority with immediate effect to exercise the powers conferred on it and to perform the functions assigned to it under the RERA throughout the State of West Bengal. With a further notification dated July 30, 2021, the Government of West Bengal, Housing Department, established an Appellate Tribunal known as the West Bengal Real Estate Appellate Tribunal with immediate effect. It is a sad plight that though the authorities have been established by several notifications dated July 29, 2021 and July 30, 2021, respectively, the positions of Chairperson, Members of the Regulatory Authority, Judicial Member, and Administrative Member of the Appellate Authority are still vacant. By a notice dated July 7, 2022, the Search Committee constituted under the West Bengal Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2021, invited eligible and willing persons for the above-mentioned position.

A time-bound and proper implementation of the real estate regulatory law RERA in the state is required. Lack of implementation of RERA has left home buyers in the lurch as neither new complaints can be filed against builders nor existing complaints already filed before the erstwhile WB-HIRA can be continued and home buyers are being subjected to even more ruthless exploitation by builders since there is no mechanism in the state at present for redressal of home buyers’ grievances.

WB-HIRA is a “virtual replica” of the Central Law. A significant and even overwhelmingly large part of WB-HIRA overlaps with the provisions of RERA, but it does not complement the central law by fortifying the rights, obligations, and remedies.


Thinking through Timelines: Acceptance of Rent Amounts to Waiver of Termination of Lease?

On June 24, 2022, the Supreme Court of India while deciding the matter of Sri K.M. Manjunath Vs. Sri Erappa G,[i] held that mere acceptance of rent by landlord after the expiry of lease would not amount to waiver of termination of lease.



The dispute in this matter arose in connection with unregistered lease agreements for the lease of shop premises at Banaswadi Main Road, Bengaluru. Pursuant to the expiry of the last lease deed executed between the parties, the respondent-lessor filed a suit for ejectment before the Small Causes Court against the petitioner-lessee to obtain vacant possession of the shop premises. The Small Causes Court dismissed the suit for ejectment on the grounds that the suit was not maintainable as there was no valid termination of tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“ToP Act”) (detailed hereinbelow).

Aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal, the respondent-lessor preferred a revision petition before the Karnataka High Court (“High Court”). Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, which inter alia consisted of unregistered lease agreements executed between the parties during the period of 1989 to 1995, the High Court noted that the duration of the lease agreements could be inferred to be for a period of 11 (eleven) months each, and thus the lease granted thereunder stood terminated by efflux of time. Hence, the petitioner-lessee was not entitled to notice under section 106 of the ToP Act. The High Court thus set aside the judgement of the Small Causes Court.

The petitioner-lessee thereafter filed a special leave petition (“Special Leave Petition”) before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment and final order of the High Court.


Applicable Provisions and Contentions


The primary contention in the matter was the applicability of section 106 of the ToP Act, which provides that where there is no written contract for the lease of immovable property, not being leased for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, the period of the lease shall be deemed to be from month to month and terminable by 15 (fifteen) days’ notice. The contention of the petitioner-lessee before the Small Causes Court was that no valid notice was served by the respondent-lessor as per this provision. On the basis of the aforesaid, the Small Causes Court ruled in favour of the petitioner-lessee. However, based on the aforementioned evidence evaluation, the High Court determined that the lease in this case stood determined by virtue of section 111(a) of the ToP Act, which provides that a lease may come to an end by efflux of time limited therein.

The Supreme Court, in the Special Leave Petition, took note of the contention of the petitioner-lessee that after the expiry of the period of the last lease agreement, the petitioner-lessee was continuing as a tenant in sufferance and had paid the rent till the date of the filing of the suit for ejectment.




Considering the above provisions and contentions, the Supreme Court appreciated the reiteration of the High Court, based on the precedents relied upon by the High Court, that mere acceptance of the rent does not amount to a waiver of the termination of the tenancy. The Supreme Court, however, granted the request of the petitioner-lessee for a grant of time to vacate the shop premises by allotting a period of 6 (six) months from the date of its judgement to hand over the possession of the shop premises to the respondent-lessor. The aforesaid extension was granted subject to the petitioner-lessee submitting an undertaking on affidavit to pay the arrears of rent at the rate of INR 1400/- (Indian Rupees One Thousand Four Hundred only) per month for the arrears pending from the year 2017 (as determined by the High Court) and extending to the aforesaid period of 6 (six) months.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and dismissed the Special Leave Petition for being devoid of merit.


The Takeaway


The reaffirmation of the Supreme Court on non-waiver of termination in this matter reinforces the significance of capturing the duration of the lease in crystal clear terms in lease agreements. Detailing timelines for termination and notice period is just as important. As seen in the facts of the discussed case, the absence of such agreed timelines can further complicate disputes arising between the parties. Hence, customising such timelines on a case-specific basis is critical, while adopting timelines based merely on common practice is best avoided.


[i]Petition For Special Leave To Appeal (C) NO.10700 OF 2022 filed before the Supreme Court Of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction.

Image Credits: Photo by  Tierra Mallorca on Unsplash

The reaffirmation of the Supreme Court on non-waiver of termination in this matter reinforces the significance of capturing the duration of the lease in crystal clear terms in lease agreements. Detailing timelines for termination and notice period is just as important. 


Failure to Obtain Occupancy Certificate a Deficiency in Service by Developer: A Note on the Supreme Court’s Decision

On January 11, 2022, the Supreme Court of India delivered a noteworthy decision in the case of Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd.,[i] by affirming that the failure of a developer to obtain an occupancy certificate would constitute a deficiency in service under the consumer protection law of India.

Relevance of Occupancy Certificate


Setting up one’s perfect abode for peaceful dwelling calls not only for a perfect finishes and a picturesque interior but also entails ensuring that all housing-related statutory requirements are fulfilled. One such indispensable compliance, the very mention of which causes flat owners to prick up their ears is an occupancy certificate. Under such an occupancy certificate, the local municipal authority permits the occupation of any building, as provided under local laws, which has provision for civic infrastructure such as water, sanitation and electricity.[ii]

However, a large number of flat owners across the country are far from having a perfect legally compliant abode given the failure of developers to obtain occupancy certificates in a timely manner. As a matter of practice, flat owners would take possession of their flats before obtaining the occupancy certificate and refurbishing the interiors, which, in some cases would result in a violation of statutory requirements and would further complicate the process of obtaining an occupancy certificate. In the case of old buildings, the developers are seldom approachable, and the residents are left helpless, in anticipation and burdened with extra costs for years.


Background of the Case


The flat owners in the case of Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd., had purchased flats from Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. (“Respondent-Developer”) around the year 1993, were given possession of their flats around the year 1997, and had further constituted themselves into a co-operative housing society viz. ‘Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Limited’ (“Appellant-Society”). The Respondent-Developer failed to obtain the occupancy certificate for the buildings of the Appellant Society but went ahead and delivered possession of the flats. Consequently, the Appellant Society, being ineligible to obtain electricity and water supply services in the absence of the occupancy certificate, was burdened with extra taxes and charges payable to the local municipal authority, including payment of excess property tax at 25 per cent over and above the normal rate and water charges at 50 per cent over and above the normal rate.

In the year 1998, the Appellant-Society instituted a consumer complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“SCDRC”) seeking that the Respondent-Developer be directed to obtain the required occupancy certificate. The SCDRC not only issued a direction to the Respondent-Developer to obtain the required occupancy certificate within a period of 4 months but also directed the payment of INR 100,000/- towards reimbursement of the excess water charges paid by the Appellant-Society. Upon the failure of the Respondent-Developer to comply with the aforesaid directions of SCDRC, the Appellant-Society filed a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”), the apex consumer dispute resolution forum in the country, in the year 2016.

The aforesaid complaint was filed on the statutory ground of ‘deficiency in service’ of the Respondent-Developer and the Appellant-Society sought payment of INR 26,073,475/- as reimbursement of excess charges and tax paid by the Appellant-Society and INR 2,000,000/- towards the mental agony and inconvenience caused to the members of the Appellant-Society. However, the NCDRC dismissed the aforesaid complaint on the grounds of being time-barred and the ineligibility of the Appellant Society to seek relief as a ‘consumer’ under Section 2(1)(d) of the governing statute i.e., the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“CP Act”). The Appellant-Society thereafter challenged the decision of the NCDRC before the Supreme Court.


Operating Law


In addition to dealing with the point of limitation as per the CP Act, the Supreme Court, in its analysis, considered the provision of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963 (“MOF Act”), which was introduced to curb malpractices by developers in relation to the sale of flats on an ownership basis.

Section 3 of the MOF Act prevents a developer from allowing a flat purchaser to take possession of a flat before the completion certificate, as may be required under law, is duly obtained by the developer from the local authorities.

Section 6 of the MOF Act obligates a developer to discharge payment of all outgoings, including municipal or other taxes and water charges, until the developer transfers the flats to the flat owners or organisation of flat owners. Further, the aforesaid provision clarifies that the developer will continue to be liable for payment of dues and penalties related to the outgoings which were collected from the flat owners prior to the transfer of the flats, even after such transfer is completed.

By a co-joint reading of Sections 3 and 6 of the MOF Act, the Supreme Court concluded that the Respondent-Developer was obligated to provide the Appellant-Society with the occupancy certificate and was also liable to discharge payment of all outgoings until such a certificate was provided. The Supreme Court further observed that the failure of the Respondent-Developer to do so was a continuing wrong and the Appellant-Society was entitled to claim compensation for such continuing wrong.


The Verdict


Following the above analysis, the single-judge bench of Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud dealt with the findings of the NCDRC and overruled the decision of the NCDRC on the eligibility of the Appellant-Society as a consumer under Section 2(1)(d) of the CP Act. Based on precedent judgments of the Supreme Court, it was concluded that the failure of a developer to obtain an occupancy certificate or abide by contractual obligations would amount to a deficiency in service under the CP Act. The Supreme Court thus held that:

“In the present case, the respondent was responsible for transferring the title to the flats to the society along with the occupancy certificate. The failure of the respondent to obtain the occupation certificate is a deficiency in service for which the respondent is liable. Thus, the members of the appellant society are well within their rights as ‘consumers’ to pray for compensation as a recompense for the consequent liability (such as payment of higher taxes and water charges by the owners) arising from the lack of an occupancy certificate.”

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court thus, directed NCDRC to decide the complaint based on the observations made by the Supreme Court in deciding the appeal and dispose of the complaint within a period of 3 months from the date of the judgment therein.


Significance of the Judgment


It is noteworthy that the provisions of the MOF Act have been interpreted in conjunction with the consumer protection law to offer relief to flat owners. It is expected that this judgment can come to the aid of flat owners who have purchased flats and are waiting for decades for regularisation of their flats.

In the present scenario, under the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (“RER Act”) (which was introduced in the succession of the MOF Act) developers are obligated to obtain the completion certificate or the occupancy certificate, or both, as applicable, from the relevant authority and make the same available to the flat purchasers or association of flat purchasers.[iii] Hence, for buildings that are registered under the RER Act, the authority set up under the RER Act can be approached in case of delay by the developer to provide an occupancy certificate.

Thus, the instant matter also resounds an alarm bell for developers to ensure that the occupancy certificate requirements are complied with as a prime concern as flat purchasers may have recourse to multiple forums to seek relief in case of any delay in this regard.


[i]Civil Appeal No. 4000 of 2019 in the Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction.

[ii]Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (Act No. 16 of 2016), §2(zf).

[iii]Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016, § 11(4)(b).


Image Credits: Photo by Tierra Mallorca on Unsplash

It is noteworthy that the provisions of the MOF Act have been interpreted in conjunction with the consumer protection law to offer relief to flat owners. It is expected that this judgment can come to the aid of flat owners who have purchased flats and are waiting for decades for the regularisation of their flats. In the present scenario, under the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (“RER Act”) (which was introduced in the succession of MOF Act) developers are obligated to obtain the completion certificate or the occupancy certificate, or both, as applicable, from the relevant authority and make the same available to the flat purchasers or association of flat purchasers.


Note in Relation to Registration of Transactions of Fragmented Land

The office of Inspector General of Registration and Controller of Stamps of State of Maharashtra issued a Circular dated July 12, 2021 bearing number 249/2013/454 concerning registration of documents which are subject to the provisions of Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2015 (“Circular”).

The Circular considers the 2015 amendment to the Prevention of Fragmentation and
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (“Act”), whereby section 8B of the Act was introduced
and consequently, the provision of the Act that imposed certain restrictions on the transfer of
fragmented land holdings (viz. sections 7, 8 and 8AA) was made inapplicable to the following

  1. Which are situated within the limits of a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council; or
  2. Which are situated within the jurisdiction of a Special Planning Authority or a New Town Development Authority appointed or constituted under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”) or any other law for the time being in force; or
  3. Which are allocated to residential, commercial, industrial or any other non-agricultural use in the draft or final regional plan prepared under the MRTP Act or any other law for the time being in force.

The above exemption was, however, subject to the proviso which stated that no person shall
transfer any parcel of land situated in the areas specified above, which has an area less than the
standard area notified before the date of coming into force of the Maharashtra Prevention of
Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2015, unless such parcel was
created as a result of sub-division or layout approved by the Planning Authority or the
Collector, under the provisions of the MRTP Act or any other law for the time being in force.

Further the Circular states that in view of the above provision, it has been observed that despite
the condition stipulated under the aforesaid proviso, transactions continue to take place in
relation to such land holdings without obtaining appropriate permission as stated therein. Thus,
the following directions have been provided:

  1. Where the total area of a survey number is two acres and if one, two or three gunthas of land is being sold out the same survey number, the document relating to such transaction will not be registered unless the layout of such survey number shows the demarcation of the one-two guntha(s) of land parcel and unless such demarcated layout is approved by the Collector or competent authority.
  2. If any party has already purchased a fragmented land parcel, the approval of the competent authority as per section 8B of the Act is to be obtained.
  3. Where land boundaries of the fragmented land parcel have been demarcated or if such fragmented land has been surveyed by the Government Land Records Department and such demarcation map reflects the independent boundaries of the land parcel to be sold, the above stated permission will not be required. However, the above-described conditions will subsequently apply to the land so demarcated and separated.

In accordance with the above, the Circular directs sub-registrars to exercise caution in the
matter and ensure that there are no irregularities while registering such documents and in case
of any irregularities being found, appropriate administrative action may be taken against the
concerned sub-registrar.

Image Credits: Photo by Gautier Pfeiffer on Unsplash

The Circular directs sub-registrars to exercise caution in the
matter and ensure that there are no irregularities while registering such documents.


Force Majeure: Evolution of Jurisprudence in India Post COVID-19

The extraordinary outbreak of the Covid19 pandemic has had staggering effects on the economy, health and commerce of about 110 nations across the globe. Even after almost a year, the situation is far from normal. In addition to the massive pressure on the health and medical segments, several other unprecedented factors played crucial part in the whole system, economy, commerce, or business. Given the present situation of disruption of supply chaindisruption of assured manpower, uncertainty of future planning, inadequacy of security as well as the forced restraints in free commercial activities, numerous commercial contracts have either been interrupted, delayed or cancelled. The present situation has thrown light on several important questions with respect to the jurisprudence of the force majeure clause in various commercial contracts or frustration of contracts 


Force Majeure Typically in Law


The term force majeure which seems to have been borrowed from the Code Napoleon had received interpretation in several decisions of the English Courts in earlier years. In Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co.[i] . Justice Bailhache opined that force majeure would include strikes and break-down of machinery but not bad weather, or football matches, or a funeral. In Lebeeaupin v. Crispin[ii] Justice McCardie had observed: “A force majeure clause should be construed in each case with a close attention to the words which precede or follow it, and with due regard to the nature and general terms of the contract. The effect of the clause may vary with each instrument.”

In the Indian context, the Supreme Court has considered, interpreted and decided the events of force majeure in various judicial precedents, inter-alia from Satyabrata Ghosh vs Mugneeram Bangur[iii] to Energy watchdog vs CERC[iv] The Court has maintained a strict yet flexible approach towards the concept of force majeure and frustration of contracts. In the case of Alopi Prashad and Sons vs. UOI[v] the Supreme court had observed that commercial hardship shall not be a just and reasonable ground to support frustration of contract and excuse performance.

As we find in the commercial world, contracting parties have generally been incorporating the force majeure clause in their contracts since ages, to absolve themselves of any liability arising out of events beyond their reasonable control. However, in this discussion we would focus the force majeure arising out of Covid-19 pandemic.


COVID 19 and Application of Force Majeure


There was a difference of opinions and questions were raised over the fact that some contracts though having a force majeure clause, do not stress on the word ‘pandemic’, ‘epidemic’, ‘disease’ etc. , while majority of the contracting parties rely on the general phrase ‘any other unforeseeable event, not under the control of either of the parties.’

Executive Interpretation:

Alike the private sector, the Government contracts and the Public Sector transactions also started suffering on account of the pandemic and declaration of lockdown throughout the country. To address the situation fairly, the Ministry of Home Affairs came out with Notification No. F. 18/4/2020 PPD dated 19-02-2020 with respect to Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 declaring that the interruptions in supply chain due to Covid 19 from China or any other country shall be covered under the ambit of force majeure, and that force majeure shall be invoked whenever considered appropriate following the due process of law.

While the power of the Ministry to bring certain events within the ambit of force majeure under clause 9.7.7 of the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 by a simple notification, may be a different issue, but as it appears, by this notification the Corona Pandemic was brought within the meaning of force majeure as defined in the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 and tacitly, this event certainly becomes applicable in respect of all government and/or public sector contracts irrespective of application of the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017.  It may be noted that this Memorandum of 19th February 2020 was issued prior to Covid-19 affecting operations in India, recognizing the difficulty faced by the contracting parties regarding import of materials from other countries which were impacted by the pandemic.

Similarly, on account of various representations and submissions made by various Renewable Energy (RE) Developers and RE Associations, and considering the prevailing situation, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy vide Office Memorandum No. 283/18/2020-GRID SOLAR dated March 20, 2020 declared Covid-19 as a force majeure event. The Ministry vide the said order granted time extensions in scheduled commissioning date of RE projects, in light of disruption of supply chain due to the pandemic.

The Ministry of Roads Transport and Highways also in its Circular dated 18.05.2020 inter-alia classified the pandemic as a force majeure event. In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs by its Order no. 40-3/2020(D) dated 24 March 2020 expressed that the country was threatened with the spread of Covid 19 virus and therefore has considered to take effective measures to prevent its spread across the country and therefore in exercise of powers under section 10(2)(I) of the Disasters Management Act 2005 issued various guidelines for immediate implementation. Subsequently, by Office Memorandum dated 13 May 2020 the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure referred to its earlier memorandum dated 19 February 2020 and also referred to the Manual of Procurement and recognized inter-alia that in view of the prevailing restrictions, it may not be possible for the parties to the contract to fulfill contractual obligations. Therefore, after fulfilling due procedure and wherever applicable, parties to the contract could invoke force majeure clause for all construction / works contracts, goods and services contracts, and PPP contracts with Government Agencies up to a certain period and subject to certain conditions. Therefore, officially the Government of India recognized Covid-19 Pandemic as an event of force majeure applicable in relation to contracts with Government Agencies, in effect resulting inclusion of Public Sector Undertakings also.

While the specific acceptance of force majeure in relation to Government sector contracts may not have any binding effect on the contracts outside the scope of the explicit instances or in relation to purely private contracts between two private parties, they probably offered an explanatory value to bring Covid 19 and the forced restraints imposed on account of lockdowns, within the ambit of force majeure.  

Judicial Interpretation:

In the Indian judicial scenario the court would rely on the terms of force majeure clause in the contracts or on principles of frustration under section 56 of the Contract Act. This means, unless there is compelling evidence for non-performance of contract the courts do not favor parties resorting to frustration or termination of contract. On account of the enormous devastative effects the Pandemic created on the commercial and economic environment in the country, different Courts had to come forward and grant relief to different contracting parties who were severely affected by the Pandemic.

The Delhi High Court considered the matter in June 2020 in the case of MEP Infrastructure Developers Ltd vs. South Delhi Municipal Corporation and Ors[vi]. The court essentially relied on the Ministry of Roads Transport and Highways (MORTH) circular and observed that:

27(i) The respondent Corporation itself referred to Circular dated 19.02.2020 which notified that the COVID-19 pandemic was a force majeure occurrence. In effect, the force majeure clause under the agreement immediately becomes applicable and the notice for the same would not be necessary. That being the position, a strict timeline under the agreement would be put in abeyance as the ground realities had substantially altered and performance of the contract would not be feasible till restoration of the pre-force majeure conditions.” 

The court also expounded on the continuous nature of the force majeure event and held that the subsequent lockdown relaxations given by the central government and the state government shall not amount to abatement of the force majeure event, at least in respect to major contracts such as road construction projects. The court also identified the distinct effects of the lockdown, independent of the effects of the pandemic and its implications on various contracts which many be affected by the force majeure conditions.  

In the case of Standard Retail vs G.S Global Corp Pvt. Ltd[vii] steel importers had approached the Bombay High Court seeking restraint on encashment of letters of credit provided to Korean exporters in view of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown declared by the Central/State Government citing that the contracts between the parties were unenforceable on account of frustration, impossibility, and impracticability. The Bombay High court by its order dated 8 April 2020 rejected the plea inter-alia on the grounds: 

  1. The Letters of Credit are an independent transaction with the Bank and the Bank is not concerned with underlying disputes between the buyers and the sellers.
  2. The Force Majeure clause in the present contracts is applicable only to one respondent and cannot come to the aid of the Petitioners.
  3. The contract terms are on Cost and Freight basis (CFR) and the respondent had complied with its obligations and performed its part of the contracts and the goods had already been shipped from South Korea. The fact that the Petitioners would not be able to perform its obligations so far as its own purchasers are concerned and/or it would suffer damages, is not a factor which can be considered and held against the Respondent.

The court also observed that:  

“The Notifications/Advisories relied upon by the respondent suggested that the distribution of steel has been declared as an essential service. There are no restrictions on its movement and all ports and port related activities including the movement of vehicles and manpower, operations of Container Freight Station and warehouses and offices of Custom Houses Agents have also been declared as essential services. The Notification of the Director General of Shipping, Mumbai, states that there would be no container detention charges on import and export shipments during the lockdown period.

In any event, the lockdown would be for a limited period and the lockdown cannot come to the rescue of the Petitioners so as to resile from its contractual obligations with the Respondent No. 1 of making payments”.

Therefore, even if the event is a force majeure, contracts may not be avoided if the event does not affect performance of the entire contract or affect every aspects of any contract. The event has to be specific to the failure.

In the Halliburton case[viii] , decided on May 29, 2020, the Delhi High court was of an unequivocal opinion that:

“62. The question as to whether COVID-19 would justify non-performance or breach of a contract has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case. Every breach or non-performance cannot be justified or excused merely on the invocation of COVID-19 as a Force Majeure condition. The Court would have to assess the conduct of the parties prior to the outbreak, the deadlines that were imposed in the contract, the steps that were to be taken, the various compliances that were required to be made and only then assess as to whether, genuinely, a party was prevented or is able to justify its non- performance due to the epidemic/pandemic”.

Further, while discussing the scope of the force majeure clause in contracts it was observed by the court that:

“Para 63. It is the settled position in law that a Force Majeure clause is to be interpreted narrowly and not broadly. Parties ought to be compelled to adhere to contractual terms and conditions and excusing non-performance would be only in exceptional situations. As observed in Energy Watchdog it is not in the domain of Courts to absolve parties from performing their part of the contract. It is also not the duty of Courts to provide a shelter for justifying non- performance. There has to be a ‘real reason’ and a ‘real justification’ which the Court would consider in order to invoke a Force Majeure clause”.

The Madras High Court in the case of Tuticorin Stevedores’ Association vs The Government of India[ix], dated 14 September 2020, observed that the question as to whether on account of the pandemic outbreak of Covid-19, the parties can invoke the principle of force majeure need not detain us. The calamitous impact and disruption caused by Covid-19 on the economic front has been recognized by the Government itself.

In Confederation for Concessionaire Welfare & Ors. vs Airports Authority of India & Anr[x] the Hon’ble Delhi High Court observed on 17 February 2021 inter-alia that the court has perused the clauses relating to Force Majeure. There can be no doubt that the pandemic is a force majeure event. Since the Petitioners wish to terminate/exit from their respective agreements, while directing completion of pleadings and while the issues are under examination by this Court, there is a need to reduce the risk to both parties as simply postponing the exit by the Petitioners would also make it impossible for the AAI to re-allot the spaces to willing concessionaires and the outstanding against the Petitioners would continue to mount. Accordingly, as an interim measure the Hon’ble Court directed certain processes to be followed.

In another case of Ramanand vs. Dr. Girish Soni RC.[xi], an application came under consideration of the Delhi High Court which raised various issues relating to suspension of payment of rent by tenants owing to the COVID-19 lockdown crisis and the legal questions surrounding the same. By order dated 21-5-2020 the Delhi High court while determining whether lease agreements are covered under the ambit of section 32 and section 56 of the Act and even though it was held that suspension of rent on the grounds of force majeure is not permissible under the circumstances, the court allowed relaxation in the schedule of payment of the outstanding rent owing to the lockdown.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parvasi Legal Cell and Ors. Vs Union of India and Ors., observed that the pandemic was an ‘unusual’ situation, that had impacted the economy globally. This case revolved around the liability of the airlines to compensate passengers who faced cancellation of flights due to government-imposed lockdowns and restrictions on inter-state and international travels. The court relied on the office memorandum issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation dated 16th April 2020 to dispose of the petition.

In the case of Transcon Iconia Pvt. Ltd v ICICI Bank[xii], the Bombay High Court while determining whether moratorium period would be excluded for NPA classification observed inter alia as under:

‘38… the period of the moratorium during which there is a lockdown will not be reckoned by ICICI Bank for the purposes of computation of the 90-day NPA declaration period. As currently advised, therefore, the period of 1st March 2020 until 31st May 2020 during which there is a lockdown will stand excluded from the 90-day NPA declaration computation until — and this is the condition — the lockdown is lifted’.

Yet, in another judgment passed in R. Narayan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.[xiii] the Madras High Court directed the Municipal Corporation to waive the license fee for running a shop at a bus stand, and observed that:

“…this Court would be justified in treating the “lock down” as a force majeure event which will relieve the licensee from performing his obligation to the corresponding extent.” The Court also observed that … “The respondents (The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.) themselves have chosen to treat the lock down restrictions as a force majeure event. But they have relieved the licensees from the obligation to pay the fees only for two months. The reason for granting waiver for the months of April and May would equally hold good for the entire “total lockdown” period.”

Therefore, as it appears, most of the High Courts relied on the government orders that classified pandemic as force majeure, although the relief granted in each case has been subjected to restraint based on the accompanying facts and circumstances. The common observation however remained that the Covid-19 pandemic is a force majeure event.


Key Takeaways


Hence, it can be summarized that, commercial hardship shall not be a just and reasonable ground to support frustration of contract and excuse performance. The Courts have no general inclination to absolve a party from the performance of its part of the contract merely because its performance has become onerous on account of an unforeseen turn of events. Parties are at an obligation to complete their part of the contract against all odds, within a reasonable and practical limit. However, where the contract itself either impliedly or expressly contains a term according to which performance would stand discharged under certain circumstances, the dissolution of the contract would take place under the terms of the contract itself and such cases would be dealt with under Section 32 of the Act. If, however, frustration is to take place de hors the contract, it will be governed by Section 56.

The following preliminary conditions are emerging to be sine quo non to invoke covid-19 as a valid defense for non-performance:

  1. The contract is rendered impossible to perform: To establish pandemic as a force majeure occurrence de hors the contract the parties must demonstrate how the pandemic has disturbed the fundamental basis on which the obligations and agreements of the parties rested [Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. Vs Khayaliram Jagannath[xiv]]. This principle was also adequately elaborated upon by the Bombay High Court in Standard Retail vs G.S Global Corp Pvt. Ltd. A mere invocation of the force majeure clause in light of the pandemic does not absolve the parties from discharging their contractual obligations. A prima facie case has to be built justifying the reason for inability and seeking such an exemption.
  1. Prior conduct of the parties: While pleading the defense of force majeure, it is highly pertinent for the concerned party to ensure that, prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, the party was discharging its functions in a bona fide manner within the stipulated conditions of the contract. Additionally, as enumerated in the Halliburton case by the Delhi High Court, the concerned party should have demonstrated a bona fide attempt at undertaking all reasonable measures to execute its obligations in light of the situation and was genuinely prevented to act upon the same due to the collateral effects of the pandemic.
  1. Collection of documents capable of corroborating the claim of force majeure: It is crucial for the party invoking the force majeure clause to corroborate their claims with valid documents applicable to the specific instance, given the unusual and unprecedented situation. In the present scenario, these documents can include the abovementioned government circulars and guidelines, local medical reports, news reports, announcements etc. It needs to be kept in mind that generic documents howsoever crucial they may be, might not be enough in any specific case. While citing such documents, the affected party also has a duty to carry out a due diligence to ensure such exemptions and relaxations are strictly applicable to their case as observed in Standard Retail vs G.S Global Corp Pvt. Ltd.


No Straitjacket Formula                     


As can be summarized, different Courts in India have upheld the defense of frustration of contract and the defense of force majeure sparingly in every case. Even though the Covid 19 pandemic and its consequent lockdown can be generally covered under the ambit of force majeure, but there can’t be any straitjacket formula and its invocation strictly and solely shall depend upon the facts of each case, previous conduct of the parties and the prevailing circumstances in the specific scenario. If there are alternate modes of performing contractual obligations, the liable party shall not have the luxury to hide behind the comfort of doctrine of frustration or the doctrine of force majeure and absolve themselves of their duties. Accordingly, it would need a very careful examination of the whole situation before any ground is taken for avoidance of obligations under a concluded contract.


[i] (1915) 1 K.B. 681

[ii] (1920) 2 K.B. 714

[iii] [1954 SCR 310]

[iv] [(2017)14 SCC 18].

[v] [1960 (2) SCR 793]

[vi] W.P.(C) 2241/2020

[vii] Commercial Arbitration Petition (l) no. 404 of 2020

[viii] Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Vedanta Ltd. O.M.P (I) (COMM.) No. 88/2020 & I.As. 3696-3697/2020

[ix] WP(MD)No.6818 of 2020 and WMP(MD)No.6217 of 2020

[x] W.P.(C) 2204/2021 & CM APPL.6421-22/202

[xi] REV447/2017

[xii] 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 626

[xiii] Case No.19596 of 2020 and W.M.P.(MD)Nos.16318 & 16320 of 2020

[xiv] AIR 1968 SC 552

Image Credits: Photo by Medienstürmer on Unsplash

The Courts have no general inclination to absolve a party from the performance of its part of the contract merely because its performance has become onerous on account of an unforeseen turn of events. Parties are at an obligation to complete their part of the contract against all odds, within a reasonable and practical limit.


Land Acquisition in India – A Tough Balancing Act

Sovereigns across the globe have relied upon the doctrine of eminent domain to acquire land for public use. Consent of those who own the land takes a backseat when the greater good is at stake. Guided by this utilitarian principle and to usher a sense of equality among the economically weaker citizens of this nation, ‘right to property’ was removed as a fundamental right through the 44th amendment. However, democracy demands people-pleasing and power mongers have to give in once in a while for a euphoric sense of justice to prevail. Consequently, the doctrine of eminent domain was balanced through the introduction of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlements Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR Act). The act empowered central and state governments to acquire lands for the development of public good with ‘consent’.

However, acquisition of land comes under Schedule VII i.e. the concurrent list which means both state and central governments can devise laws under it. This provided scope for abuse by states which enacted similar laws on land acquisition suiting their specific requirements. While doing this, the states remained undeterred by ‘Article 21’ that ensures the right to personal liberty and dignity, thus clearly defying the ‘basic structure’ of the constitution. Further, land acquisition under the said state laws was in blatant violation of the requirement that central laws enacted on subjects under the concurrent list must take precedence over the state laws. Federalism in this regard didn’t favour the distressed population. This misuse of power has caused negative externalities to the marginalized populations and the role of the capitalist class and private players in connection to the political establishment has been visible. This paper seeks to examine the impact of the state legislation which has resulted in exploitative conditions and varying judgments by high courts across the country.

The 2013 Act and 2014 Amendment Ordinance

The reasons for the introduction of the RFCTLARR Act in 2013 included lack of standing for the people displaced, lack of participation in the acquisition decision, inadequate compensation, insufficient coverage of families affected by the acquisition, procedural delays, and inequities as well as non-use of the land acquired. To some extent, the new law acted as a huge relief for marginalized landowners but it did not go down well with the state governments or industry participants who started protesting against the cumbersome process and the acquisition cost that, according to them, would hinder developmental activities.

To plug the vehement protests, an ordinance was promulgated that substantially altered the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act by exempting five categories of projects from the consent and social impact assessment provisions i.e. defense, rural infrastructure, affordable housing, industrial corridors, and infrastructure projects including Public-Private Partnership (PPP).[i] However, the ordinance lapsed after a few re-promulgation and law to replace the ordinance has not and most likely would not see the light of the day due to the sensitive nature of the subject and intense contestations by the stakeholders. A Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is now shouldering the responsibility of bringing about the amendments.

Dilution of Key Provisions by States

In the meanwhile, several states have already brought about changes through Rules under Section 109 of the Act or have enacted their own state-level land acquisition legislations. At least six state governments have enacted their own land acquisition laws by seeking Presidential consent using Article 254 (2) of the constitution. These new state laws directly adopt the amendments proposed by the 2014 land ordinance and exclude acquisitions for certain purposes from the purview of the central law. State-level rules are diluting the applicability of progressive clauses like prior consent, public hearings, or Social Impact Assessment (SIA).

In Jharkhand, the state rules reduce the quorum of the gram sabha consent to one-third from half as required in the central rule. In Odisha and Jharkhand, unused acquired lands are repatriated into land banks rather than returning it to the original owners as required by the central law. The Tamil Nadu law allows unused land to be taken for any other purpose, provided the District Collector certifies the same. State Rules are reducing the amount of compensation to be paid against acquisitions. In states like Haryana, Chhattisgarh, and Tripura the multiplying factor for rural land is fixed at 1.00 as against 2.00 as specified in the central law.[ii]

Judicial Developments

While the states have been busy bypassing the law, courts have had to deal with a bombardment of litigation requiring interpretation of key provisions of the RFCTLARR Act as well as determining the constitutional validity of the state enactments. Key pronouncements have been made with regards to Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act which states that after initiating land acquisition for a project under the 1894 law if the physical possession has not been taken by the developer or the compensation not paid to the landowners for more than five years, the acquisition process would lapse. In such cases, the government would have to initiate fresh acquisition under the Act.

A three-judge bench of the apex court had held in Pune Municipal Corporation v Harakchand Misirimal Solanki that mere deposit of compensation in government treasury cannot be regarded as a payment made to the landowner and acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act will lapse in such cases. The decision was overruled by another three-judge bench in Indore Development Authority vs Shailendra holding that deposit of the award in treasury should be regarded as payment to the landowner who is refusing to accept compensation. Following the contradictory stand, a bench has been constituted by the CJI to end the controversy and all compensation matters in land acquisition cases pending in high courts have stayed till the issue is settled.

In another stark turn of events, the Madras High Court declared as “illegal” the amendment made by the Tamil Nadu government to the Centre’s Land Acquisition Act, exempting three state legislations from its purview. The court said, “In order to revive these acts, the State must re-enact these statutes, in accordance with Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India and obtain the assent of the President. Merely, by inserting Section 105-A and the 5th Schedule, in the new Act, these impugned enactments do not get revived. Since this had admittedly not been done, the Acts remain repugnant, and Article 254(1) renders them inoperative.”

Alternative to Acquisition

As far as the issue of developmental activities being hindered because of difficulty in land acquisition is concerned, the centre should look at encouraging land leasing and land pooling as is already being practiced in Haryana and UP. In such arrangements, the landowner lends the land to the government for a steadily increasing rent, or through an annuity-based system or through land development by a government agency, it said. Under pooling, the group of landowners gives their land to a government agency for developing the land with infrastructure and amenities and later they get a part of it back in return.

Achieving a balance

While RFCTLARR has completed six years, it has brought in radical awareness among the advocates of fair acquisition. This has led to increasing land litigations and a gradual rise in the intervention by courts. The progress of RFCTLARR is instrumental in shaping economic revival considering India’s fluctuating growth rates in recent years. There are more than 13,000 cases of land acquisition pending in courts. This raises concerns about the efficacy of the Act and the recent amendments. A conducive relation between fair compensation and economic development is essential in achieving a balance to boost not only economic growth but to aid the overall development of the nation.


[i] Section 10A of the LARR Ordinance, 2014



Image Credits: Nandhu Kumar on Unsplash

While RFCTLARR has completed six years, it has brought in radical awareness among the advocates of fair acquisition. This has led to increasing land litigations and a gradual rise in the intervention by courts. The progress of RFCTLARR is instrumental in shaping economic revival considering India’s fluctuating growth rates in recent years. There are more than 13,000 cases of land acquisition pending in courts. This raises concerns about the efficacy of the Act and the recent amendments.


Housing Apartheid In Urban Areas: A Constitutional Challenge

“Excellent brand new 2bhk fully furnished flat, cross ventilation, natural light, cosmopolitan society, no Muslims; with car-parking, on immediate sale, 5th floor. If interested, pls call___” read the controversial advertisement for a flat in Dadar (East), Mumbai.[1] This generated a furore and resulted in the removal of the advertisement from the website and a statement from them claiming that they were opposed to any kind of discriminatory practice.[2]



Jayanagar is one of the largest residential areas in Bangalore. The population is mostly dominated by upper-class Hindus and is extremely notorious in its treatment towards Muslims and sometimes to Christians too, with respect to letting outhouses.[3] They mask their prejudice mostly in the garb of not letting houses out to non-vegetarians (which is problematic on its own). The tolerance level is higher for Hindu non-vegetarians (preferably non-SC/ST), then Christians, then SC/STs and then Muslims.

These incidents and many more in addition to them provide a propitious opportunity to discuss housing apartheid, which is not peculiar to a particular area or city. The examples stated above display instances of housing apartheid in most cosmopolitan cities in the country. They illustrate discrimination and prejudice, either overtly or covertly, and, in my opinion, are in direct violation of Article 15 of the Constitution of India[4].

The concept of housing apartheid is elucidated herein by first discussing the infamous Supreme Court case, Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. District Registrar Co-operative Societies (Urban),[5] which allowed for setting up of segregated housing societies, and then proceed to evaluate the constitutional provisions in the context of right to housing, for Muslims in particular, and finally query into the feasibility of regulating the private sphere in this context.


The case


In the Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Limited case,[6] members of the Parsee community established a housing society and limited membership to the co-operation, through a bye-law, only to persons belonging to that community. The Respondent applied to the society, seeking permission to demolish the building and use the space for construction of a commercial building. Permission was not granted as the bye-laws of the society did not allow for the use of the property for commercial purposes. Subsequently, when he applied for permission to construct residential flats to be sold to Parsees, he was permitted to go ahead. When he entered into negotiations with a builders’ association for sale of property, he violated the restriction placed upon him with respect to not allowing membership of non-Parsees in the co-operative society. The matter reached the High Court of Gujarat when the society challenged such a violation. The High Court rejected the claim of the society and held that restricting membership would amount to a violation of the right to property and Article 300A. Subsequently, the society went on appeal to the Supreme Court of India, wherein the claim was upheld and the court held that the bye-law was not in contravention with Section 4 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act which laid down that any bye-law which contravenes public policy would not be recognised. The court’s understanding of this provision was that public policy has to be located within the confines of the Act and not look for constitutional principles or provisions unless explicitly provided by the Act.  This judgement also held that a co-operative society does not come under the fold of a ‘state’ under Article 13 of the Constitution of India[7] and accordingly, a fundamental rights challenge cannot be held valid as they are attracted only when a state action contravenes these rights.

This is an extremely verticalist interpretation of the Constitution[8] and potentially bad in law. By taking this approach, the court has completely disregarded the obligation of non-state actors in not violating fundamental rights. For example, Article 17 of the Constitution[9] would be rendered a toothless provision if it is not enforceable against non-state actors. Another example that is closer to the topic in discussion is the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,[10] wherein, the Supreme Court issued guidelines and norms to be followed in order to prevent instances of sexual harassment against women at workplaces. Observance of these guidelines would not have been effective if state actors were the only bodies expected to do so. Horizontal application of fundamental rights, i.e., a rights challenge enforceable against both state and non-state actors, was etched out clearly in this case.


Right to housing


The Supreme Court has endorsed a segregationist view by allowing community based housing, despite religion being an explicitly mentioned ground for non-discrimination.[11] The Indian society has undergone the trauma of partition, and in this framework, it is important and would be a highly mature approach if consideration is given to what it means for a minority community to practice, profess and propagate their religion, without having the fear of being discriminated against, and the degree to which the right to dignity may enable an individual or a group of persons to enjoy the right to freedom of religion without the expectation and fear of either implicit or visible manifestations of hate and incitement to religious hatred.

The ease with which the Supreme Court allowed for such a discriminatory practice based on a specified ground to pass gives a huge leeway for other discriminatory practices based on non-specified grounds to be carried out, such as refusing housing on grounds such as HIV status, sexual orientation, disability, language etc.[12]


What can be done about it?


The Justice Sachar Committee Report (Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India), 2006 was submitted by the expert level group set by the Ministry of Minority Affairs.[13] It was recommended by this report that an Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) be set up to keep a check on discrimination against minorities. The Madhava Menon Committee was set up in order to examine and analyse the structure and functioning of the EOC. This committee proposed the draft EOC Bill in 2008.[14] The Union Cabinet on 20 February 2014 gave its nod to the setting up of this Commission.[15]

While this Commission seeks to make a paradigm shift in the way equality is understood in the traditional sense, it is also onerous on the Commission to not exclude the housing sector from its immediate scope. Several critics have opined that such an Act would pervade into the private sphere of the landlord with respect to the choices that he/she would want to make about who to let out the house to. However, with the horizontal application of fundamental rights, such a problem would not arise as a violation of Article 15 would be enforceable against a private party too.

In arguendo, if such an application of fundamental rights were not allowed then, such a restriction on the choice of the landlord should be considered as a reasonable restriction as a direct co-relation can be made to increasing ghettoization of certain communities due to the practice of housing apartheid.[16]




The Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Limited case narrowed down the scope of constitutional interpretation. However, with the coming of the EOC, the right to housing has to be construed as a constitutional guarantee and only when this is done can the principle of minority protection, which is one of the foremost responsibilities of the Constitution, be said to have been achieved to an extent.



[1] Saurabh Gupta, Mumbai: No Muslims, said online ad for a flat, NDTV, 8 November 2013, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[2] Mumbai property broker posts online ad, says no to Muslims, IBN Live, 7 November 2013, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[3] Zainab Bawa, The Shame of a Name, Kafila, 20 March 2009, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[4] Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth

(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to

(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment; or

(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public

(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children

(4) Nothing in this article or in clause ( 2 ) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes

[5] AIR 2005 SC 2306.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights:

(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void

(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void

(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires law includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law; laws in force includes laws passed or made by Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368 Right of Equality

[8] Ashish Chugh, Fundamental Rights: Vertical or Horizontal?, (2005) 7 SCC (J) 9.

[9] Abolition of Untouchability: Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law

[10] AIR 1997 SC 3011.

[11] Under Article 15 of the Constitution of India.

[12] Tarunabh Khaitan, Reading Swaraj into Article 15: A New Deal for all the Minorities, 2 NUJS L. Rev. 419 (2009).

[13] Justice Sachar Committee Report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[14] Madhav Menon Committee Report on Equal Opportunity Commission: What, Why and How?, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[15] Govt clears Panel to check Discrimination against Minority, The Indian Express, 20 February 2014, available at: communities (Last visited on 18 March 2014).

[16] Rafiq Dossani, The Future of Indian Muslims, Stanford Journal of Muslim Affairs, available at: (Last visited on 18 March 2014).



Image Credits: Photo by <a href=”;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=1407562″>Photo Mix</a> from <a href=”;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=1407562″>Pixabay</a>

The Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Limited case narrowed down the scope of constitutional interpretation. However, with the coming of the EOC, the right to housing has to be construed as a constitutional guarantee and only when this is done can the principle of minority protection, which is one of the foremost responsibilities of the Constitution, be said to have been achieved to an extent.


Property Rights of an Unborn Child in India

While most debates surrounding the existence of a person before birth and after death are theological or philosophical in nature which could go on endlesslythe debate concerning the right of yet-to-be-existent person needs to be settled conclusively. Especially, ascertaining property rights of an unborn is essential as it has a direct implication on the rights of other existent individuals. Although the Indian laws recognize the existence of an unborn as a legal person, rights are not granted until the birth of the child. Further, while a child in a mother’s womb is considered as person for many purposes, the extent of the unborn child’s personal or proprietary rights has not been categorically determined. The unborn is regarded by legal fiction as already born for creation of interest in property.  

Moreover, the right to life has been guaranteed as a fundamental right to everyone under Article 21 of the constitution of India, which may be deemed to include an unborn child. Renowned scholars have also opined that ‘the State should not discriminate between persons who have taken birth and persons who are still in the womb of a mother’. Therefore, the State is under an obligation under Article 21 not only to protect the life of an unborn child from arbitrary and unjust destruction but also not to deny it equal protection under Article 14.i  

Further, judicial pronouncements have tried to shed some light on the status and rights of an unborn child. In the case of Tagore V. Tagoreii, the Supreme Court observed that foetus/infant in a womb is a person in existence for the purpose of making a gift to an unborn child. Subsequently, in the case of Jabbar V. Stateiii, the Court has also held that the term ‘person’ would include an unborn child in the mother’s womb after seven months of pregnancy. This would mean that it is capable of being spoken of as a person if its body is developed sufficiently.  

Property Rights of an Unborn under the Transfer of Property Act, 1884 (“TP Act”): 

Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, any property (movable or immovable) can be bequeathed in favour of an unborn child. However, an interest created in favour of an unborn is contingent on the occurrence of birth. Further, interest cannot be transferred directly to an unborn, it must be transferred to another living person or a trust must be created for the purpose.  

Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows: 

‘Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transfer in the property.’ 

As the above provision defines an unborn child is a child or a baby in its mother’s womb. A person yet to be born does not have any existence and is not counted as a living person, still the property can be transferred to the unborn child/baby. 

Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:  

Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of person not then living, he acquires upon his birth, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer, a vested interest, although he may not be entitled to the enjoyment thereof immediately on his birth.’ 

Therefore, an unborn child i.e. an Infant En Ventre Sa mere can attain definite rights and inherit property only if he/she is born alive and such rights can be vested in the hands of his/her trustees.   

Conditions required for the transfer of property to an unborn child: 

  1. Absolute interest must be made in the favour of unborn child; 
  1. Creation of prior life interest in favour of a person who is in existence on the transfer date. 

As soon as the unborn child takes birth, the property rights immediately get transferred in his/her name. Post which he or she will be the sole owner of the property. 

Property Rights of an Unborn under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: 

According to the Mitakshara school of law, a son by birth acquires an interest in the ancestral property of the joint family. Whereas, under the Dayabhaga school, the son has no automatic ownership right by birth but acquires it on the demise of his father.iv 

The conflict has been somewhat resolved by the express acknowledgment under Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which recognises the rights of a child in the womb; 

A child who was in the womb at the time of the death of an intestate and who is subsequently born alive shall have the same right to inherit to the intestate as if he or she had been born, before the death of the intestate, and the inheritance shall be deemed to vest in such a case with effect from the date of the death of the intestate.’ 

In the case of FM Devaru Ganapati Bhat V. Prabhakar Ganapati Bhatv, the Court held that ‘There is no ban on the transfer of an interest in favour of an unborn person. Section 20 permits an interest being created for the benefit of an unborn person who acquires interest upon his birth. Where the donor gifted the property in favour of the appellant, then living, and also stipulated that if other male children are later born to her brother they shall be joint holders with the appellant, the court also held that such stipulation is not hit by Section 13 of the Act. Creation of such a right is permissible under Section 20 of the Act. 

Mulla on Hindu Law, Fifteenth Edition, contains a commentary by the author while dealing with Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956  The commentary reads thus: 

It is by fiction or indulgence of the law that the rights of a child born justo matrimonio are regarded by reference to the moment of conception and not of birth and the unborn child in the womb if born alive is treated as actually born for the purpose of conferring on him benefits of inheritance. The child in embryo is treated as in esse for various purposes when it is for his benefit to be so treated. This view is not peculiar to the ancient Hindu law but one which is adopted by all mature systems of jurisprudence. This section recognises that rule of beneficent indulgence and the child in utero although subsequently born is to be deemed to be born before the death of the intestate and inheritance is to be deemed to vest in the child with effect from the date of the death of the intestate.” 


Therefore, it is pertinent that the status of a human being in the making and the related rights are expressly clarified through adequate legislation. Judicial pronouncements, though binding, have been varying and evolving. In a country where even a defamed deceased has right to sue, it is essential that the property rights of future citizens are secured adequately.  


Image Credits: Photo by Ashton Mullins on Unsplash

It is pertinent that the status of a human being in the making and the related rights are expressly clarified through adequate legislation. Judicial pronouncements, though binding, have been varying and evolving.