Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code: Shifting Paradigm of Social & Digital Media Platforms

It has been just over six months since the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (the “Rules“) have been notified. However, these six months have been nothing short of a roller coaster ride for the (Internet) Intermediaries and Digital Media platforms, especially Social Media platforms who have tried to muddle through the slew of compliance obligations now imposed through these eccentric Rules. Notwithstanding, some of them had to face the wrath of the Government and even Courts for the delay in adherence.

On this topic, we are trying to stitch together a series of articles covering the entire gamut of the Rules, including their objective, applicability, impact, and the key issues around some of the rules being declared unconstitutional, etc.

In our first article, we analyse the timeline, objectives, and applicability of these Rules through some of the definitions provided under the Rules and the IT Act.

Tracing the Roots of the Digital Media Ethics Code 

The initiation of this endeavour can be tracked down to July 26, 2018, when a Calling Attention Motion was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on the misuse of social media and spread of fake news, whereby the Minister of Electronics and Information Technology conveyed the Government’s intent to strengthen the existing legal framework and make social media platforms accountable under the law. Thereafter, the first draft of the proposed amendments to the Intermediary Guidelines, The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines (Amendment) Rules) 2018, was published for public comments on December 24, 2018.

In the same year, the Supreme Court in Prajwala v. Union of India[1] directed the Union Government to form necessary guidelines or Statement of Procedures (SOPs) to curb child pornography online. An ad-hoc committee of the Rajya Sabha studied the issue of pornography on social media and its effects on children and the society and laid its report recommending the facilitation of identification of the first originator of such contents in February 2020.

In another matter, the Supreme Court of India on October 15 2020, issued a notice to the Union Government seeking its response on a PIL to regulate OTT Platforms. The Union Government subsequently on November 9 2020, made a notification bringing digital and online media under the ambit of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, thereby giving the Ministry the power to regulate OTT Platforms.

On February 25, 2021, the Union Government notified the much-anticipated Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, bringing various digital entities under its purview and imposing new compliances to regulate them.

 

Objectives of the Digital Media Ethics Code

The rising internet and social media penetration in India raises concerns of transparency, disinformation and misuse of such technologies. The Rules address these concerns and bring accountability to social and digital media platforms by mandating the setting up of a grievance redressal mechanism that adheres to statutory timeframes. The Rules also address the legal lacuna surrounding the regulation of OTT platforms and the content available on them and introduces a three-tier content regulation mechanism.

Key definitions and the applicability of the Digital Media Ethics Code

The Rules add on extensively to the 2011 Intermediary Guidelines and also introduce new terms and definitions. To understand the Rules and the compliances thereunder in a holistic manner, it becomes imperative to learn the key terms and definitions. This also addresses concerns of applicability of the Rules to different entities, as they prescribe different sets of compliances to different categories of entities.

Key definitions:

Digital Media as per Rule 2(1)(i) are digitised content that can be transmitted over the internet or computer networks, including content received, stored, transmitted, edited or processed by

  • an intermediary; or
  • a publisher of news and current affairs content or a publisher of online curated content.

This broadly includes every content available online and every content that can be transmitted over the internet.

Grievance as per Rule 2(1)(j) includes any complaint, whether regarding any content, any duties of an intermediary or publisher under the Act, or other matters pertaining to the computer resource of an intermediary or publisher as the case may be.

Intermediary has not been defined in the Rules, but as per S. 2(1)(w) of the IT Act, intermediary, with respect to any particular electronic record, is any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes.

The first part of the definition lays down that an Intermediary with respect to an electronic record, is any person that receives, stores or transmits that electronic record on behalf of another person.

An entity becomes an intermediary for a particular electronic record if that record is received by, stored in or transmitted through the entity on behalf of a third party. However, as the clause does not use the term “collect” with respect to an electronic record, any data that entities may collect, including IP Addresses, device information, etc., do not fall within the definition’s purview. Hence the entities would not be considered as intermediaries for such data.

Moreover, the second part of the definition lays down that those entities that provide any service with respect to an electronic record would be intermediaries. However, what constitutes “service” has been a key point of discussion in prior cases. In Christian Louboutin Sas v. Nakul Bajaj[2], the Court not only held that the nature of the service offered by an entity would determine whether it falls under the ambit of the definition, but also went on to hold that when the involvement of an entity is more than that of merely an intermediary, i.e., it actively takes part in the use of such record, it might lose safe harbour protection under S. 79 of the Act.

The definition also includes telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places, and cyber cafes as intermediaries. In Satish N v. State of Karnataka[3], it was held that taxi aggregators like Uber are also intermediaries with respect to the data they store. Therefore, Telecom Service Providers like Airtel, Vi, Jio, etc., Network Service Providers like Reliance Jio, BSNL, MTNL, etc., Internet Service Providers like ACT Fibernet, Hathaway, etc., Search Engines like Google, Bing, etc., Online Payment gateways like Razorpay, Billdesk etc., Online Auction Sites like eBay, eAuction India, etc., Online Market Places like Flipkart, Amazon etc. are all considered intermediaries.

Social Media Intermediaries as per Rule 2(1)(w) is an intermediary which primarily or solely enables online interaction between two or more users and allows them to create, upload, share, disseminate, modify or access information using its services. This includes platforms like Tumblr, Flickr, Diaspora, Ello, etc.

Significant Social Media Intermediaries as per Rule 2(1)(v) is a social media intermediary having number of registered users in India above such threshold as notified by the Central Government. Currently, the threshold is 5 million users. Platforms that fall under this category would be Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Snapchat, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Telegram etc.

News & current affairs content as per Rule 2(1)(m) includes newly received or noteworthy content, including analysis, especially about recent events primarily of socio-political, economic or cultural nature, made available over the internet or computer networks, and any digital media shall be news and current affairs content where the context, substance, purpose, import and meaning of such information is in the nature of news and current affairs content. Therefore, news pieces reported by newspapers or news agencies, shared online, on social media, or on digital media platforms are news & current affairs content. This includes contents of such nature created by any person and shared through social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter etc. Digital content discussing news and the latest happenings will also come under the purview of this definition.

Newspaper as per Rule 2(1)(n) as a periodical of loosely folded sheets usually printed on newsprint and brought out daily or at least once in a week, containing information on current events, public news or comments on public news. Newspapers like The Hindu, Times of India etc. will fall under this category.

News aggregator as per Rule 2(1)(o) is an entity performing a significant role in determining the news and current affairs content being made available, makes available to users a computer resource that enable such users to access such news and current affairs content which is aggregated, curated and presented by such entity. This includes platforms like Inshorts, Dailyhunt etc.

Online curated content as per Rule 2(1)(1) is any curated catalogue of audio-visual content, other than news and current affairs content, which is owned by, licensed to or contracted to be transmitted by a publisher of online curated content, and made available on demand, including but not limited through subscription, over the internet or computer networks, and includes films, audio visual programmes, documentaries, television programmes, serials, podcasts and other such content. This includes movies and shows available on OTT platforms like Netflix, Prime Video, Disney+Hotstar etc.

Publisher of News and Current Affairs Content as per Rule 2(1)(t) includes online paper, news portal, news aggregator, news agency and such other entities, which publishes news and current affairs. This would include websites/apps such as The Wire, The News Minute, Scroll.in, Dkoding.in, The Print, The Citizen, LiveLaw, Inshorts etc.

While the Rules do not include the regular newspapers or replica e-papers of these newspapers, as they come under the Press Council Act, news websites such as Hindustantimes.com, IndianExpress.com, thehindu.com are covered under the Rules, and the Union Government clarified the same on June 10, 2021. The clarification stated that websites of organisations having traditional newspapers and digital news portals/websites of traditional TV Organisations come under the ambit of the Rules.

This does not include news and current affairs reported or posted by laymen or ordinary citizens online, as the scope is limited only to news publishing agencies.

Publisher of Online Curated Content as per Rule 2(1)(u) is a publisher who performs a significant role in determining the online curated content being made available and enables users’ access to such content via internet or computer networks. Such transmission of online currented content shall be in the course of systematic business or commercial activity. This includes all OTT platforms, including Netflix, Prime Video, Voot, Lionsgate, Disney+Hotstar, etc.

The Digital Media Ethics Code Challenged in Court

Part III of the IT Rules has been challenged by many persons in various High Courts. News platforms including The Wire, The Quint, and AltNews moved to the Delhi High Court, alleging that online news platforms do not fall under the purview of Section 87 of the IT Act, under which these Rules are made as the section is only applicable to intermediaries. Section 69A is also limited to intermediaries and government agencies. It is alleged that since such publishers are not intermediaries, they do not fall under the purview of the IT Rules.

A similar petition was moved by LiveLaw, a legal news reporting website before the Kerala High Court, alleging that the Rules violated Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution and the IT Act.[4] The petitioners contended that the Rules had brought Digital News Media under the purview of the Press Council of India Act and the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, without amending either of the two legislations. They also alleged that the rules were undoing the procedural safeguards formed by the Supreme Court in the Shreya Singhal[5] case. In this regard, the Kerala High Court has ordered that no coercive action is to be taken against the petitioner as interim relief.

Recently, the Bombay High Court in Agij Promotion of Nineteenonea v. Union of India[6] delivered an interim order staying Rules 9(1) and 9(3), which provides for publishers’ compliance with the Code of Ethics, and the three tier self-regulation system respectively. The Court found Rule 9(1) prima facie an intrusion of Art. 19(1)(a).

Legality & Enforceability of the Digital Media Ethics Code

Even though six months have passed since the Rules came into force, the legality and enforceability of the Rules are still in question. While most intermediaries, including social media and significant social media intermediaries, have at least partly complied with the Rules, the same cannot be said for publishers of news and current affairs content and online curated content. This will have to wait until the challenges to its legality and constitutionality are settled by Courts.

References:

[1] 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3419.

[2] 2018 (76) PTC 508 (Del).

[3] ILR 2017 KARNATAKA 735.

[4] https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/kerala-high-court-new-it-rules-orders-no-coercive-action-issues-notice-on-livelaws-plea-170983

[5] (2013) 12 SCC 73.

[6] Agij Promotion of Nineteenonea v. Union of India, WRIT PETITION (L.) NO.14172 of 2021.

Image Credits: 

Photo by Jeremy Bezanger on Unsplash

 

Even though six months have passed since the Rules came into force, the legality and enforceability of the Rules are still in question. While most intermediaries, including social media and significant social media intermediaries, have at least partly complied with the Rules, the same cannot be said for publishers of news and current affairs content and online curated content. This will have to wait until the challenges to its legality and constitutionality are settled by Courts.

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Deduction of Tax at Source under Section 194N Restrained

The Kolkata High Court has passed an interim order restraining the deduction of tax at source under section 194N of the Income Tax Act till 30 September 2021 and directed that the matter be scheduled for final hearing after a period of eight weeks. The constitutional validity and legality of section 194N of the Act were challenged, by way of a writ petition, before Kolkata High Court in the case of Amalgamated Plantations Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.[1]

Section 194N – In Brief

The Finance Act, 2019 had inserted Section 194N under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), with effect from 1 September 2019, which mandates the deduction of tax at source at the rate of 2% on cash withdrawals from, inter alia, a banking company, on an amount exceeding INR 1 crore during the relevant tax year. The intention of introducing such provision under the Act was to discourage cash transactions and move towards cashless economy.

The Finance Act, 2020 substituted the above provisions to expand its scope. The revised threshold limit and rate of tax under section 194N of the Act have been summarised as follows:

Aggregate cash withdrawals in a tax year Rate of TDS
ITR of last 3 years filed ITR of last 3 years not filed
Up to INR 20 lakhs NIL NIL
Exceeds INR 20 Lakhs up to INR 1 crore NIL 2%
Exceeds INR 1 crore 2% 5%

The constitutional validity and legality of section 194N of the Act were challenged, by way of a writ petition, before Kolkata High Court in the case of Amalgamated Plantations Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.[1] (“the Petitioner”)


Is Section 194N beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament?


The Petitioner contended that the provisions of section 194N of the Act are beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament.

In this regard, the Petitioner placed reliance on Entry 82 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, which empowers the Parliament to enact laws for imposition, collection and levy of tax on ‘income’. It was contended that the Parliament cannot legislate a provision for deduction of tax at source on an amount which is not an ‘income’.

The Petitioner further placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of Kanan Devan Hills Plantations Company Pvt. Ltd[1] wherein, on a similar issue, the Kerala HC has admitted the writ petition and granted stay on deduction of tax at source under section 194N of the Act.

 

Interim Order on Section 194N

The Kolkata HC observed that the afore-mentioned order of Kerala HC has not been further challenged and the said interim order is still existing. It also observed that the Kerala HC, on the same issue, has passed series of orders admitting writ petitions and staying deduction of tax under section 194N of the Act.

Considering the above, the Kolkata HC has passed an interim order restraining the deduction of tax at source under section 194N of the Act till 30 September 2021 and directing that the matter be scheduled for final hearing after a period of eight weeks. In the interim, the Court has also directed that the Revenue authorities (“the Respondent”) and the Petitioner can file affidavit-in-opposition & reply thereof, respectively.

 

FM Comments:

The interim order of the Kolkata HC restraining the deduction of tax at source under section 194N of the Act is indeed a landmark order. The same should go a long way in deciding the constitutional validity and legality of this controversial provision in the law.

However, in the interim, it would be worthwhile to examine whether the benefit of the above order can be availed by other taxpayers at large.

At this juncture, it is also pertinent to highlight the fact that, although the intention of the legislature was to move towards a digital and cashless economy, one cannot lose sight of the fact that cash withdrawals from banks, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered, as ‘income’ earned by the recipient. As such, the collection of tax on such amounts ought to be treated as violative of the basic principles enshrined under our income-tax law.

If the issue is finally decided against the Revenue authorities, it would be an embarrassing setback vis-à-vis the Government’s significant efforts in moving towards a cashless economy.

Collection of tax on an amount that is not an ‘income’ of the recipient was an extreme step taken by the Government and going forward, more pragmatic approach may be expected to achieve the goal of a cashless and digital economy.

References:

[1] WPA 10826 of 2021

[2] WP (C) No. 1658 of 2020 dated 13/08/2020

Image Credits: Photo by Mathieu Stern on Unsplash

The Finance Act 2020 had expanded the scope of Section 194N, which earlier mandated the deduction of tax at source for cash withdrawals above a certain limit, by revising the threshold. The section has been challenged as ultra-vires. 

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SC: Consideration Paid for Purchase of Computer Software, Not Royalty, No Obligation on Buyers to Deduct Tax at Source

IN BRIEF:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (SC) has at long last, put to rest the two-decade old controversy in relation to taxability of the consideration paid for purchase of computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer. The controversy revolved around whether the consideration paid for purchase of the computer software would constitute ‘Royalty’ as per the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, read with relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (‘DTAA’). There were divergent views of some High Courts as well as of the Authority for Advance Rulings on this issue, which, thankfully, has now been settled by the Hon’ble SC, against the Revenue and in favour of the taxpayers.

In the case of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited1 and others (Appellants), the Hon’ble SC has held that the consideration paid for purchase of an off-the- shelf software from a non-resident seller does not tantamount to ‘Royalty’ as per Article 12 of the DTAA and hence there is no obligation on the Indian buyer to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), as the distribution agreements/ End-User Licence Agreements (EULAs) do not create any interest or right in such distributors/ end-users which would tantamount to the use of or right to use any copyright.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Appellants had imported/ acquired shrink wrapped computer software from non-residents distributor/ manufacturers. While making payment to those non-residents, the Appellants did not deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act, on the premise that such amounts do not constitute ‘Royalty’; hence are not taxable in India as per the relevant DTAA and accordingly, there could not be any obligation on them to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act.

QUESTION BEFORE THE SC:

The key question before the Hon’ble SC was whether there would be any obligation on a resident buyer, acquiring computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer, to deduct tax at source, under section 195 of the Act, by classifying the consideration paid as ‘Royalty’ under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, read with Article 12 of the relevant DTAA.

There were various appeals/ questions raised before the Hon’ble SC, which were grouped into four categories:

a) Computer software purchased directly by resident end-users from non-resident suppliers or manufacturers.
b) Resident distributors or resellers purchasing computer software from non-resident suppliers or manufacturers and then reselling the same to resident Indian end-users.
c) Non-resident distributors reselling the computer software to resident Indian distributors or end-users.
d) Computer software embedded into hardware and sold as an integrated unit/equipment by non-resident suppliers to resident Indian distributors or end-users.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Appellant’s contentions have been summarized below:

  •  Computer software that is imported for onward sale constitutes ‘Goods’.
  • Definition of Royalty as per DTAA did not extend to a derivative product of the copyright. For example, a book or a music CD or software products.
  • Retrospective amendment to section 9(1)(vi) by Finance Act 2012 could not be applied to assessment years under consideration, as the law cannot compel one to do the impossible.
  • Provisions of DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Act to the extent they are more beneficial to the deductor of tax under section 195 of the Act.
  • Distinguishment can be made between the sale of a copyrighted article v/s. the sale of copyright itself. As per section 14(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 Act (“CA Act”), ‘Computer Program’ and a ‘copy of Computer Program’ are two distinct subject matters. In the instant case, no copyright was transferred, as the end-user only received a limited license to use the product by itself with no right to reproduce, sub-licence, lease, make copies, etc.
  • It was also contended that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act would apply only to section 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act and would not expand the definition of Royalty as contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. Further, reference was made to Circular No. 10/2002 issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), wherein, ‘remittance for royalties’ and ‘supply for computer software’ were addressed as separate distinct payments, the former attracting the ‘royalty’ provision and the latter taxable as business profits.
  • Based on the doctrine of first sale/ principle of exhaustion, it was argued that the foreign supplier’s distribution rights would not extend to sale of copies of the work to other persons beyond the first sale.

REVENUE’S CONTENTION:

The Revenue’s contentions have been summarized below:

  • The primary contention of the Revenue was that what was transferred in the transaction between the parties was copyright and accordingly the payment would constitute Royalty and Indian user/ importer would be required to deduct tax at source.
  • It was argued that explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act applies to payments to a non-resident by way of royalty for the use of or the right to use any copyright. Reliance was placed on the language of explanation 2(v) and it was stressed that the words “in respect of” have to be given a wide meaning.
  • The Revenue further contended that since adaptation of software could be made, albeit for installation and use on a particular computer, copyright was parted with by the original owner.
  • It was further pointed out that the Indian Government has expressed its reservations on the OECD Commentary dealing with the parting of copyright and royalty.
  • It was argued that in some of the EULAs, it was clearly stated that what was licensed to the distributor/end-user by the non-resident would not amount to a sale, thereby making it clear that what was transferred was not goods.
  • It was further argued that explanation 4 of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act existed with retrospective effect from 1976 and accordingly the Appellants ought to have deducted the tax at source even prior to the year 2012.
  • The Revenue placed reliance on the ruling of PILCOM v. CIT, West Bengal- VII, 2020 SCC Online SC 426 [“PILCOM”]2, which dealt with section 194E of the Act, for the proposition that tax has to be deducted at source irrespective of whether tax is otherwise payable by the non-resident assessee.
  • With respect to the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion, it was argued that it would have no application since it is not statutorily recognised in section 14(b)(ii) of the CA Act. Accordingly, it was contended that when distributors of copyrighted software ‘license’ or ‘sell’ such computer software to end-users, there would be a parting of a right or interest in copyright; in as much as, such “license” or sale would be hit by section 14(b)(ii) of the CA Act.

THE RULING:

  • Provisions of CA Act

The Hon’ble SC placed reliance on the provisions of the CA Act and observed as under:

The expression ‘copyright’ means the “exclusive right” to do or authorise the doing of certain acts “in respect of a work”. In the case of a computer program, section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the CA Act prescribes certain acts as to how the exclusive rights with the owner of the copyright may be parted with. Thus, the nature of rights prescribed under section 14(a) and section 14(b) of the CA Act would be referred to as “copyright”, which would include the right to reproduce the work in any material form, issue copies of the work to the public, perform the work in public, or make translations or adaptations of the work.

Section 16 of the CA Act states that no person shall be entitled to copyright otherwise than under the provisions of the CA Act or any other law for the time being in force. Accordingly, it is held that the expression ‘copyright’ has to be understood only as is stated in section 14 of the CA Act.

On perusal of the distribution agreements, the Hon’ble SC observed that what is granted to the distributor is only a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence to resell computer software and it was expressly stipulated that no copyright and no right to reproduce the computer program, in any manner, is transferred either to the distributor or to the ultimate end user.

It further observed that the ‘license’ that is granted under EULA, conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, is not a licence that transfers an interest in all or any of the rights contained in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the CA Act. The SC held that there must be a transfer by way of license or otherwise, of all or any rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the CA Act.

  • Sale of Goods

The SC further observed that what is ‘licenced’ by the non-resident supplier/ distributor is in fact a sale of a physical object, which contains an embedded computer program and thereby held the same as “sale of goods” by placing reliance on the ruling of Hon’ble SC in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) SCC 308.3

  • Royalty in the DTAA vs the Act

It was observed that DTAA provides an exhaustive definition of ‘Royalty’ as it uses the expression “means” whereas the definition of ‘Royalty’ contained in the Act is wider in nature. Accordingly, Article 12 of the DTAA defining the term ‘Royalty’ would be relevant to determine taxability under DTAA, as it is more beneficial to the assessee as compared to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

It was further observed that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act (retrospectively introduced vide Finance Act, 2012) is not clarificatory of the position as of 1 June 1976, but it expands the existing position and hence it does not clarify the legal position as it always stood.

The SC relied on two legal maxims, lex non-cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., the law does not demand the impossible and impotentia excusat legem, i.e., when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law and further relied on various judicial precedents and held that any ‘person’ cannot be expected to do the impossible and accordingly the expanded definition of Royalty inserted by explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act cannot apply retrospectively, as such explanation was not actually and factually in the statute.

  • PILCOM Ruling

It was observed that the PICLOM ruling was in respect of section194E of the Act which deals with a different set of TDS provisions, without any reference to chargeability to tax under the Act. As already held in GE Technology4, deduction of tax under section 195 can be made only if the non-resident assessee is liable to pay tax under the provisions of the Act and accordingly it had no application to the present facts of the case.

  • Doctrine of First Sale/ Principle of Exhaustion

The SC relied on various judicial precedents to explain the concept of the doctrine of first sale/ principal of exhaustion, which enables free trade in material objects on which copies of protected works have been fixed and put into circulation, with the right holder’s consent. The said principle was introduced in the CA Act, vide amendment made in the year 1999.

Based on the above principle, it is held that the distribution rights subsist with the owner of the copyright, to the extent such copies are not already in circulation. Thus, it is the exclusive right of the owner to sell or to give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental, ‘any copy of computer program’. The distributor who resells the computer program to the end-user cannot fall within its scope.

  • Interpretation of treaties and OECD Commentary

India has reserved its right under the OECD Commentary with respect to taxation of royalties and fees for technical services. However, in this regard, the SC has noted that, after India took such positions, no bilateral amendment was made by India and the other Contracting States to change the definition of royalties. Accordingly, the OECD commentary would only have persuasive value with respect to the interpretation of the term ‘Royalties.

  • CBDT Circular No. 10/2202 dated 9 October 2002

The SC further referred to the above-mentioned Circular, wherein the Revenue itself has made a distinction between royalties and remittance for the supply of computer software (which is treated as business profits and taxability depends upon the existence of permanent establishment in India).

  • Ruling

In light of the aforementioned reasoning, the Hon’ble SC held that the consideration paid for the purchase of an ‘off-the-shelf’ software from a non-resident seller did not amount to ‘Royalty’ as per Article 12 of DTAA, as the distribution agreements/ EULAs did not create any interest or right in such distributors/ end-users, which tantamounted to the use of or right to use any copyright. Since the amount was not chargeable to tax in India, there was no obligation on the Indian resident buyer to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act.

FM COMMENTS:

The taxation of royalty has always been a vexed issue in the Indian context. There have been conflicting rulings on the issue relating to the characterization of payments towards the purchase of computer software. This is indeed a welcome ruling, which has finally put to rest a long litigation.

However, it is pertinent to note that the Finance Act, 2020 has introduced the provisions of ‘equalisation levy’ leviable on a non-resident e-commerce operator from e-commerce supply of services. These transactions are exempted from Income-tax under section 10(50) of the Act.

Further, vide, Finance Bill 2021, it has been clarified that exemption under section 10(50) will not apply to royalty or fees for technical services, that are taxable under the Act read with the DTAA. Hence, as a corollary, it may be deduced that, based on this SC ruling, if a non-resident takes shelter under the DTAA, for payments that are made to it for purchase of computer software, the non-resident could still be liable to pay equalisation levy on the satisfaction of certain prescribed conditions. It is therefore advised that going forward, such issues are analysed carefully and separately, before arriving at any conclusion on the effective taxability that arises. Additionally, in cases where the payments are being made to parties residing in non-DTAA countries, suitable arguments would require to be made, on a case-to-case basis using this decision as a persuasive tool.

1 Civil Appeal Nos 8733 – 8734 of 2018
2 [2020] 271 Taxman 200 (SC)
3 [2004] 271 ITR 401
4 [2010] 327 ITR 456
This article expounds a recent decision regarding tax liability on the purchase of computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer.

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