Intermediaries' Obligation to Pursue Complaints Against Infringers: Analysing the Latest Interpretation

The recent interim order dated March 1, 2023, issued by the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Enterprises vs. Flipkart Internet Private Ltd.[1] had sparked a lot of debate and confusion among the public concerning the liability of an intermediary. As per the order of the High Court, an intermediary is not obligated to take action in cases of infringement reported by their users. The Hon’ble Court delved deeply into the interpretation of Rule 3 of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, on the question of whether there exists an obligation on the part of intermediaries to act on complaints against infringers.   

Facts

The plaintiff was in the business of manufacturing and selling car covers under the marks “UK Blue” and “Autofact” and had been selling them on Flipkart since 2018. The plaintiff happened to notice that some other entities started to copy their designs, looks and marketing strategies on the Flipkart platform itself. Apart from the fact that the covers were identical, the infringers also sold these covers in a fashion similar to that of the plaintiff’s company to create confusion and boost their sales.

The plaintiff had informed and reported to Flipkart about the infringement of their products by placing screenshots and other similar evidences of infringement committed by the infringer on record. The platform refused to take any action against the infringers and advised the plaintiff to approach a court of law for redressal of IPR disputes.

The plaintiff approached the Delhi High Court, citing that Flipkart cannot act as an intermediary if it fails to adhere to its obligations as an intermediary and to observe important due diligence mandated by Rule 3(2) of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.

Law Involved

Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) requires intermediaries to inform their users of their privacy policy, rules and regulations and user agreement and shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that any information that infringes any patent, copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights shall not be hosted, displayed, uploaded, modified, published, transmitted, stored, updated, or shared by the intermediary.

Rule 3(2)(a) of the IT rules requires the intermediary to publish on its website the details of the grievance officer and the mechanism by which a user could complain about any possible violations. Further, it requires the officer to acknowledge the complaint within 24 hours and resolve the issue within a period of 15 days.  

The plaintiff relied on these two sections to further their claim of infringement against Flipkart. 

Rule 3 (2)(1) (proviso) provides for intermediaries to acknowledge any complaint within 24 hours and resolve all such complaints within 15 days from their receipt. Moreover, the proviso also calls upon the intermediary to develop appropriate safeguards to avoid any misuse by users.

The Ruling

The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that Rule 3(2)(a) only envisages complaints regarding violations of the obligation imposed on the intermediary under the rules. There is no scope for the intermediary to take any kind of action against the infringer upon receipt of the complaint. The same argument was also put forth by the court when the question surrounding Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) was raised, and the court clarified that the rule merely provides for intermediaries to inform users not to display or host infringing content. The rule does not mandate or require the intermediary to take any action upon receipt of the complaint of infringement.   

The Hon’ble Court stated that it cannot read into IT rules something that the rules do not contain expressly or by necessary implication. It further said that, “where the applicable statutory rules do not envisage action being taken by an intermediary merely on the complaint being made by an aggrieved victim or user regarding infringement of intellectual property rights, by content posted on the platform of the intermediary, the court cannot, by placing reliance on an internal policy of a particular intermediary, read into Clause 3 any such requirement, especially where such a provision existed in the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and has consciously been omitted in the 2021 Rules”.  

The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that the complaint against Flipkart that it is not taking action does not appear to be sustainable due to the above-mentioned reasons. However, a prima facie case of copyright violation was made out by the court and in order to protect the plaintiff from any further damages, an interlocutory injunction was granted against listing the alleged infringing content.

General Observations 

Though the Hon’ble Court did grant the injunction to protect the plaintiff from the ongoing infringement occurring on the platform, the main essence of the IT Act and rules was not taken into consideration while discharging Flipkart of any liability.

The plaintiff erred in not considering the many precedents laid by this very same court. For instance, in Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. vs. Myspace Inc. & Anr1, the court said that “I find that there is no impact of the provisions of Section 79 of the IT Act (as amended in 2009) on copyright infringements relating to internet wrongs where intermediaries are involved and the said provision cannot curtail the rights of the copyright owner by operation of the proviso of Section 81 which carves out an exception for cases relating to copyright or patent infringement”. 

The case witnessed that the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, overrode the provision of the safe harbour granted by the IT Act under Section 79. The Hon’ble Court relied on Section 81 of the IT Act, which provides for an exemption for people exercising their rights under the Copyright Act and the Patent Act. The Hon’ble Court should have recognised this precedent and acknowledged the obligation it posed to the intermediary to remove such infringing products from its platform.   

It doesn’t end here. The court should have considered in what instance the immunity available for intermediaries will be impacted under Section 79 of the IT Act. Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act states that upon receiving actual knowledge of an unlawful act connected to the computer resource controlled by the intermediary, the intermediary shall expeditiously remove or disable access to such infringing material. If such action is not undertaken by the intermediary, it shall lose the safe harbour guaranteed by Section 79. If safe harbour protection is not available, then allowing an infringement to take place on their platform may constitute abetment and unlawful activity which in turn would make them liable under the law of the land.  

Another striking part of the order is that, even though the Hon’ble Court completely relied on the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the court failed to read into Rule 3 (2) (1) of the IT Rules 2021. The proviso of the rule clearly stipulates that any complaint received from the user other than under Subclauses (i), (iv), and (ix) needs to be expeditiously resolved within 72 hours by the grievance officer. That does not take away the primary obligation of the intermediary to act within the 15 days mandated in the main provision in relation to such excluded matters, including cases of IP infringement. It is astonishing that the court or the parties gave more emphasis to the proviso than the main clause under Rule 3(2)(a)(i). 

Initially, Rule 3(2)(b) was worded as follows: “(i) acknowledge the complaint within twenty-four hours and dispose off such complaint within a period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt;  

(ii) receive and acknowledge any order, notice or direction issued by the Appropriate Government, any competent authority or a court of competent jurisdiction.”.   

On October 28, 2022, the government amended the above rule to read as follows: “acknowledge the complaint within twenty-four hours and resolve such complaint within a period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt: 

Provided that the complaint in the nature of request for removal of information or communication link relating to clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 3, except sub-clauses (i), (iv) and (ix), shall be acted upon as expeditiously as possible and shall be resolved within seventy-two hours of such reporting;  

Provided further that appropriate safeguards may be developed by the intermediary to avoid any misuse by users;” 

The intention of this amendment is to prescribe faster action for certain kinds of wrongdoings and expect them to act within 72 hours. At the same time, for those others (sub-clauses (i), (iv) and (ix)) the original time frame of 15 days for taking action remains. Without a doubt, the goal of this amendment is not to encourage platform users to behave irresponsibly or complacently despite being aware that the platform is frequently used to violate intellectual property rights. It merely provides them with sufficient time and excludes the requirement of compliance within 72 hours.

The intermediary is still obligated to undertake the due diligence described in Rule 3(1)(b)(iv), and if they do not do so and do not take action within fifteen days even after becoming aware of the infringement, the immunity from liability specified in Section 79 will end. The safe harbour will be eliminated because the proviso to Section 81 of the IT Act clearly indicates that IP rights are to be expected to be protected by the intermediary.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Court was right in granting the injunction in favour of the plaintiff to restrain Flipkart from allowing such infringing products on their platforms.

However, the Hon’ble Court erred by not making a harmonious reading of Rule 3 (2) (a) of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, with Section 79 (3) (b) and the proviso to Section 81 of the IT Act. An isolated reading of the provision and discharging Flipkart of their liability under the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 seems to be an oversight.

The proviso appended to the said section provides that nothing contained in this act shall restrict the exercising of any right by any person under the Copyright Act. This, along with Section 79 (3) of the IT Act, mandates the intermediary not to conspire, abet or aid any infringement and to remove the infringing material on receiving actual knowledge of it.  

The above-referred order will only help the intermediaries and platforms to behave irresponsibly and indifferently even when an intellectual property owner notifies them of infringement on their platforms. It compels aggrieved intellectual property owners to initiate legal action for every infringement, which is expensive to carry out. IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, was primarily made to make the platforms more responsible and ethical. Allowing them to act irresponsibly through a limited interpretation of law is unconscionable.

References:

1. CS (COMM) 63/2023

The recent interim order dated March 1, 2023, issued by the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Enterprises vs. Flipkart Internet Private Ltd. (CS (COMM) 63/2023) had sparked a lot of debate and confusion among the public concerning the liability of an intermediary. Though the Hon’ble Court did grant the injunction to protect the plaintiff from the on-going infringement occurring on the platform, the main essence of the IT Act and rules was not taken into consideration while discharging Flipkart of any liability.

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Decoding the India - US Transitional Approach on 2% Equalization Levy

Addressing tax issues arising in the digital economy has been a priority of the international community since past few years. In order to deliver a consensus-based solution and ensure that Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) pay a fair share of tax in the jurisdiction they operate, the Organization for Export Co-operation and Development (OECD) / G20, by way of a Statement/Deal had, on the 8th of October 2021, introduced a major reform in the international tax framework.  In all, 136 countries, including India and the USA, out of a total of 140 countries, have agreed to this Statement.

The Statement/Deal provides for an Inclusive Framework that requires countries to remove all digital services tax and other similar unilateral measures and provide for a Two-pillar solution, consisting of two components viz: Pillar One, which is about reallocation of an additional share of profit to the market jurisdictions and Pillar Two, consisting of minimum tax and subject to tax rules. For a detailed discussion on the OECD/G20 inclusive framework, kindly refer our article on OECD BEPS Framework: Recent Development.  

 

Post the issuance of the said Statement/Deal, on October 21, 2021, the United States of America (US), Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom reached an agreement on a transitional approach to the existing Unilateral Measures, while implementing Pillar One. A similar transitional approach has been agreed by India and the US on the 24th of November and notified by way of a Press Release by the Government of India- Ministry of Finance, the same has been elaborated below: 

 

Press Release dated 24th November on India and USA Agreement on Equalization Levy 

 

As per the Press Release, India and the US have agreed that the same terms that apply under the joint statement released by the US with five European countries on 21 October 2021, shall apply between the US and India, during the interim period before Pillar One rules comes into effect.

 In light of the Press Release and 21 October joint statement, impact on India’s 2% EL could be as follows:  

 

  • India will not be required to withdraw the 2% EL until Pillar One takes effect.
  • India will allow a credit of the excess of 2% EL chargeable on non-resident (NR) e-commerce operator (NR EOP), belonging to a multinational enterprise (MNE), during the “interim period”, vis-a-vis the tax liability determined under Pillar One – Amount A, for the said interim period, once Pillar One rules are in effect. As per the Press Release, this interim period will begin from 1 April 2022, till the implementation of Pillar One or 31 March 2024, whichever is earlier.
  • The US will terminate its proposed trade actions against India regarding the 2% EL.
  • India and the US will remain in close contact to ensure that there is a common understanding of the respective commitments and endeavour to resolve any further differences of views on this matter through constructive dialogue.
  • The final terms of the India-US agreement are awaited and is expected to be issued by 1 February 2022.

 

FM Comments: 

While the fine print of this agreement between the India and US is still awaited, it would be interesting to see how the 6% EL on online advertisement revenues, are proposed to be dealt with, as apparently, the same does not seem to form a part of the deal. 

It also remains to be seen what kind of potential hiccups this deal would entail, should there be a delay in the implementation of Pillar One, beyond the time provided in the deal, and the potential impact of this on the business of MNEs. 

At the given point of time, the above seems to be merely a statement of intent by the two major economies, so as to streamline the long pending issues of digital taxation. One can only hope that the said deal is not a result of threat of trade actions by the US and would indeed be a win- win for both the countries. 

Image Credits: Photo by Antonio Quagliata from Pexels

Post the issuance of the said Statement/Deal, on October 21, 2021, the United States of America (US), Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom reached an agreement on a transitional approach to the existing Unilateral Measures, while implementing Pillar One. A similar transitional approach has been agreed by India and the US on the 24th of November and notified by way of a Press Release by the Government of India- Ministry of Finance

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SC: Consideration Paid for Purchase of Computer Software, Not Royalty, No Obligation on Buyers to Deduct Tax at Source

IN BRIEF:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (SC) has at long last, put to rest the two-decade old controversy in relation to taxability of the consideration paid for purchase of computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer. The controversy revolved around whether the consideration paid for purchase of the computer software would constitute ‘Royalty’ as per the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, read with relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (‘DTAA’). There were divergent views of some High Courts as well as of the Authority for Advance Rulings on this issue, which, thankfully, has now been settled by the Hon’ble SC, against the Revenue and in favour of the taxpayers.

In the case of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited1 and others (Appellants), the Hon’ble SC has held that the consideration paid for purchase of an off-the- shelf software from a non-resident seller does not tantamount to ‘Royalty’ as per Article 12 of the DTAA and hence there is no obligation on the Indian buyer to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), as the distribution agreements/ End-User Licence Agreements (EULAs) do not create any interest or right in such distributors/ end-users which would tantamount to the use of or right to use any copyright.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Appellants had imported/ acquired shrink wrapped computer software from non-residents distributor/ manufacturers. While making payment to those non-residents, the Appellants did not deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act, on the premise that such amounts do not constitute ‘Royalty’; hence are not taxable in India as per the relevant DTAA and accordingly, there could not be any obligation on them to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act.

QUESTION BEFORE THE SC:

The key question before the Hon’ble SC was whether there would be any obligation on a resident buyer, acquiring computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer, to deduct tax at source, under section 195 of the Act, by classifying the consideration paid as ‘Royalty’ under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, read with Article 12 of the relevant DTAA.

There were various appeals/ questions raised before the Hon’ble SC, which were grouped into four categories:

a) Computer software purchased directly by resident end-users from non-resident suppliers or manufacturers.
b) Resident distributors or resellers purchasing computer software from non-resident suppliers or manufacturers and then reselling the same to resident Indian end-users.
c) Non-resident distributors reselling the computer software to resident Indian distributors or end-users.
d) Computer software embedded into hardware and sold as an integrated unit/equipment by non-resident suppliers to resident Indian distributors or end-users.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The Appellant’s contentions have been summarized below:

  •  Computer software that is imported for onward sale constitutes ‘Goods’.
  • Definition of Royalty as per DTAA did not extend to a derivative product of the copyright. For example, a book or a music CD or software products.
  • Retrospective amendment to section 9(1)(vi) by Finance Act 2012 could not be applied to assessment years under consideration, as the law cannot compel one to do the impossible.
  • Provisions of DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Act to the extent they are more beneficial to the deductor of tax under section 195 of the Act.
  • Distinguishment can be made between the sale of a copyrighted article v/s. the sale of copyright itself. As per section 14(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957 Act (“CA Act”), ‘Computer Program’ and a ‘copy of Computer Program’ are two distinct subject matters. In the instant case, no copyright was transferred, as the end-user only received a limited license to use the product by itself with no right to reproduce, sub-licence, lease, make copies, etc.
  • It was also contended that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act would apply only to section 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act and would not expand the definition of Royalty as contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. Further, reference was made to Circular No. 10/2002 issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), wherein, ‘remittance for royalties’ and ‘supply for computer software’ were addressed as separate distinct payments, the former attracting the ‘royalty’ provision and the latter taxable as business profits.
  • Based on the doctrine of first sale/ principle of exhaustion, it was argued that the foreign supplier’s distribution rights would not extend to sale of copies of the work to other persons beyond the first sale.

REVENUE’S CONTENTION:

The Revenue’s contentions have been summarized below:

  • The primary contention of the Revenue was that what was transferred in the transaction between the parties was copyright and accordingly the payment would constitute Royalty and Indian user/ importer would be required to deduct tax at source.
  • It was argued that explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act applies to payments to a non-resident by way of royalty for the use of or the right to use any copyright. Reliance was placed on the language of explanation 2(v) and it was stressed that the words “in respect of” have to be given a wide meaning.
  • The Revenue further contended that since adaptation of software could be made, albeit for installation and use on a particular computer, copyright was parted with by the original owner.
  • It was further pointed out that the Indian Government has expressed its reservations on the OECD Commentary dealing with the parting of copyright and royalty.
  • It was argued that in some of the EULAs, it was clearly stated that what was licensed to the distributor/end-user by the non-resident would not amount to a sale, thereby making it clear that what was transferred was not goods.
  • It was further argued that explanation 4 of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act existed with retrospective effect from 1976 and accordingly the Appellants ought to have deducted the tax at source even prior to the year 2012.
  • The Revenue placed reliance on the ruling of PILCOM v. CIT, West Bengal- VII, 2020 SCC Online SC 426 [“PILCOM”]2, which dealt with section 194E of the Act, for the proposition that tax has to be deducted at source irrespective of whether tax is otherwise payable by the non-resident assessee.
  • With respect to the doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion, it was argued that it would have no application since it is not statutorily recognised in section 14(b)(ii) of the CA Act. Accordingly, it was contended that when distributors of copyrighted software ‘license’ or ‘sell’ such computer software to end-users, there would be a parting of a right or interest in copyright; in as much as, such “license” or sale would be hit by section 14(b)(ii) of the CA Act.

THE RULING:

  • Provisions of CA Act

The Hon’ble SC placed reliance on the provisions of the CA Act and observed as under:

The expression ‘copyright’ means the “exclusive right” to do or authorise the doing of certain acts “in respect of a work”. In the case of a computer program, section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the CA Act prescribes certain acts as to how the exclusive rights with the owner of the copyright may be parted with. Thus, the nature of rights prescribed under section 14(a) and section 14(b) of the CA Act would be referred to as “copyright”, which would include the right to reproduce the work in any material form, issue copies of the work to the public, perform the work in public, or make translations or adaptations of the work.

Section 16 of the CA Act states that no person shall be entitled to copyright otherwise than under the provisions of the CA Act or any other law for the time being in force. Accordingly, it is held that the expression ‘copyright’ has to be understood only as is stated in section 14 of the CA Act.

On perusal of the distribution agreements, the Hon’ble SC observed that what is granted to the distributor is only a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence to resell computer software and it was expressly stipulated that no copyright and no right to reproduce the computer program, in any manner, is transferred either to the distributor or to the ultimate end user.

It further observed that the ‘license’ that is granted under EULA, conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, is not a licence that transfers an interest in all or any of the rights contained in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the CA Act. The SC held that there must be a transfer by way of license or otherwise, of all or any rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the CA Act.

  • Sale of Goods

The SC further observed that what is ‘licenced’ by the non-resident supplier/ distributor is in fact a sale of a physical object, which contains an embedded computer program and thereby held the same as “sale of goods” by placing reliance on the ruling of Hon’ble SC in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) SCC 308.3

  • Royalty in the DTAA vs the Act

It was observed that DTAA provides an exhaustive definition of ‘Royalty’ as it uses the expression “means” whereas the definition of ‘Royalty’ contained in the Act is wider in nature. Accordingly, Article 12 of the DTAA defining the term ‘Royalty’ would be relevant to determine taxability under DTAA, as it is more beneficial to the assessee as compared to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

It was further observed that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act (retrospectively introduced vide Finance Act, 2012) is not clarificatory of the position as of 1 June 1976, but it expands the existing position and hence it does not clarify the legal position as it always stood.

The SC relied on two legal maxims, lex non-cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., the law does not demand the impossible and impotentia excusat legem, i.e., when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law and further relied on various judicial precedents and held that any ‘person’ cannot be expected to do the impossible and accordingly the expanded definition of Royalty inserted by explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act cannot apply retrospectively, as such explanation was not actually and factually in the statute.

  • PILCOM Ruling

It was observed that the PICLOM ruling was in respect of section194E of the Act which deals with a different set of TDS provisions, without any reference to chargeability to tax under the Act. As already held in GE Technology4, deduction of tax under section 195 can be made only if the non-resident assessee is liable to pay tax under the provisions of the Act and accordingly it had no application to the present facts of the case.

  • Doctrine of First Sale/ Principle of Exhaustion

The SC relied on various judicial precedents to explain the concept of the doctrine of first sale/ principal of exhaustion, which enables free trade in material objects on which copies of protected works have been fixed and put into circulation, with the right holder’s consent. The said principle was introduced in the CA Act, vide amendment made in the year 1999.

Based on the above principle, it is held that the distribution rights subsist with the owner of the copyright, to the extent such copies are not already in circulation. Thus, it is the exclusive right of the owner to sell or to give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental, ‘any copy of computer program’. The distributor who resells the computer program to the end-user cannot fall within its scope.

  • Interpretation of treaties and OECD Commentary

India has reserved its right under the OECD Commentary with respect to taxation of royalties and fees for technical services. However, in this regard, the SC has noted that, after India took such positions, no bilateral amendment was made by India and the other Contracting States to change the definition of royalties. Accordingly, the OECD commentary would only have persuasive value with respect to the interpretation of the term ‘Royalties.

  • CBDT Circular No. 10/2202 dated 9 October 2002

The SC further referred to the above-mentioned Circular, wherein the Revenue itself has made a distinction between royalties and remittance for the supply of computer software (which is treated as business profits and taxability depends upon the existence of permanent establishment in India).

  • Ruling

In light of the aforementioned reasoning, the Hon’ble SC held that the consideration paid for the purchase of an ‘off-the-shelf’ software from a non-resident seller did not amount to ‘Royalty’ as per Article 12 of DTAA, as the distribution agreements/ EULAs did not create any interest or right in such distributors/ end-users, which tantamounted to the use of or right to use any copyright. Since the amount was not chargeable to tax in India, there was no obligation on the Indian resident buyer to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Act.

FM COMMENTS:

The taxation of royalty has always been a vexed issue in the Indian context. There have been conflicting rulings on the issue relating to the characterization of payments towards the purchase of computer software. This is indeed a welcome ruling, which has finally put to rest a long litigation.

However, it is pertinent to note that the Finance Act, 2020 has introduced the provisions of ‘equalisation levy’ leviable on a non-resident e-commerce operator from e-commerce supply of services. These transactions are exempted from Income-tax under section 10(50) of the Act.

Further, vide, Finance Bill 2021, it has been clarified that exemption under section 10(50) will not apply to royalty or fees for technical services, that are taxable under the Act read with the DTAA. Hence, as a corollary, it may be deduced that, based on this SC ruling, if a non-resident takes shelter under the DTAA, for payments that are made to it for purchase of computer software, the non-resident could still be liable to pay equalisation levy on the satisfaction of certain prescribed conditions. It is therefore advised that going forward, such issues are analysed carefully and separately, before arriving at any conclusion on the effective taxability that arises. Additionally, in cases where the payments are being made to parties residing in non-DTAA countries, suitable arguments would require to be made, on a case-to-case basis using this decision as a persuasive tool.

1 Civil Appeal Nos 8733 – 8734 of 2018
2 [2020] 271 Taxman 200 (SC)
3 [2004] 271 ITR 401
4 [2010] 327 ITR 456
This article expounds a recent decision regarding tax liability on the purchase of computer software from a non-resident distributor/ manufacturer.

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