Rario's Cricket NFT Case Against MPL & Striker: A Comprehensive Review

The advancement of blockchain technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and virtual digital assets has led to growing apprehension about the multitude of legal and ethical dilemmas that could arise from their development and their potential impact on the legal rights of individuals.

The Delhi High Court recently deliberated on the relationship between generative AI and personality rights in Digital Collectibles Pte. Ltd. and Ors. vs Galactus Funware Technology Private Limited and Anr. [CS (COMM) 108/2023]. In this case, the court declined to issue a temporary injunction against the gaming platforms Mobile Premier League (MPL) & Striker for using the name and likeness of certain cricketers to create Non-Fungible Token (NFT) – enabled “Digital Player Cards”.  

Non-Fungible Tokens under Copyright Law

NFTs are distinct digital assets that leverage blockchain technology to validate ownership and are frequently utilised for trading digital art and collectables. Nevertheless, an ongoing discussion revolves around the intellectual property rights tied to NFTs and the question of whether acquiring an NFT bestows copyright ownership.

On the other hand, Online Fantasy Sports (OFS) involve participants creating virtual teams of real-life athletes and competing based on their performance in real sports events. The users pay an entry fee to join and use their skills to participate in online events or leagues. Under prevailing copyright laws, purchasing an NFT does not automatically convey the legal right to claim copyright in the artwork unless a separate commercial agreement is established to that effect. In the instant matter, an OFS platform created NFT-enabled “Digital Player Cards” (DPCs) featuring the names and likenesses of certain cricketers. These digital assets could be owned and traded by users on the blockchain.

Case Overview

Digital Collectibles Pte. Ltd. (Plaintiff No. 1 here) owns and operates ‘Rario’, a digital collectables platform based on NFTs. The platform facilitates selling, purchasing, and trading officially licensed DPCs featuring cricketers. As well-known cricketers, Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 6 granted Plaintiff No. 1 an exclusive license to utilise their names and photographs on the Rario platform.

These DPCs contain names, photographs, and other personality traits of cricketers which are bought, sold, and traded for actual currency on Rario, utilising Rario’s private blockchain. The price of each DPC is determined by the demand and supply for the specific DPC, which is, in turn, influenced by the popularity and renown of the respective cricketers.

Galactus Funware Technology Private Limited (Defendant No.1) is the proprietor and operator of the online fantasy sports platform called MPL, while Defendant No. 2 is the proprietor and operator of the mobile application ‘Striker’, listed on the MPL. Like Rario, Striker users can purchase, sell, and trade DPCs and Striker also utilises NFT technology to authenticate the DPCs on its platform.

In February 2023, a suit was filed before the Delhi High Court against the defendants for using players’ names, images and other attributes (including those of Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 6) on their platforms without obtaining the players’ authorisation or license.

Right to Publicity vis-à-vis Freedom of Speech and Expression

The plaintiffs asserted that the value of the DPCs, considered digital art collectables, is primarily derived from and dependent on the names, likenesses, and other elements associated with the cricketers whose DPCs are offered on the Striker platform. Moreover, they relied on precedents set forth by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in D.M. Entertainment Pvt Ltd v Baby Gift House & Ors [MANU/DE/2043/2010] and Titan Industries v M/s Ram Kumar Jewellers [(2012) 50 PTC 486], to contend that the Striker DPCs are an unauthorised endorsement and violated the plaintiffs’ publicity rights.

In reply to the plaintiffs’ contention, the court remarked that while Indian courts have acknowledged the existence of celebrity personality rights, these rights are not absolute and must be weighed within the context of the common law principle of “passing off” and in accordance with the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

The Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Bansal opined that the right to publicity was subordinate to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the Constitution and noted that the “Right to publicity”, i.e., the right to control the commercial use of one’s identity and personality, is not absolute or unrestricted.

The celebrity’s right to publicity is only violated when using their name or image is intended to mislead the public into believing that they are endorsing and associated with the product in question. In such instances, it can be said that the celebrity’s goodwill and reputation have been misused to promote a product or service.

Use of Artwork with Creative Elements

The court highlighted that the DPCs of the defendants include artwork of the players, not photographs, and this artwork was determined to have creative elements that set them apart from the actual images of the players since the defendants have shown their expression through these creations rather than utilising celebrities’ likenesses directly. These innovative features and creative caricatures were held to be protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Players’ Information Available in Public Domain

The defendants expressed that the content used for DPCs on the Striker platform is in the public domain, which served the purpose of identifying the cricketers on the platform; thus, it is beyond the scope of those cricketers’ personality rights. It was further stated that the platform is categorised as an OFS game, which does not offer the ability to purchase and “own” cricket moments (a key feature of the plaintiffs’ licensed DPCs). The defendants asserted that their DPCs could not be traded or used outside the Striker platform as they are inherently linked to the user experience and format of the Striker platform and highlighted the usage of players’ names and other information in a similar manner is common in other OFS games, demonstrating an established industry practice.

The defendants also cited the decision of U.S. Courts in CBC Distrib. & Mktg. v Major League Baseball Advanced [505 F. 3d 959] and Daniels v Fan Duel Inc [109 N.E. 3d 390], to support their argument that if the information and facts regarding certain celebrities which the defendants use are already publicly available, there can be no valid claim for infringement of publicity rights.

The court noted that OFS operators use publicly available player names and images to identify players. Thus, the court ruled that no one can own information in the public domain and such information can’t be monopolised or licensed. Since public domain facts cannot be monopolised, a third party’s use or publication for commercial gain cannot afford the plaintiffs a cause of action. With respect to the remedies available for an aggrieved celebrity, the court only cited defamation as a resort. 

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court held that the plaintiffs failed to make out a case for the grant of an interim injunction[1] and effectively gave the go-ahead to Striker as it is not a ‘trading platform’ like Rario per se and does not mislead customers regarding any affiliation with or endorsement and does not violate any right of Digital Collectibles. Based on this, the matter has been listed for completion of pleadings on July 10, 2023.

Order of Single Judge Bench Challenged

Indian cricketers, including Mohammed Siraj, Harshal Patel, and Rario, have challenged the above interim order of the Single Judge Bench through appeals filed before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The appellants lay emphasis on the players’ absolute rights over their persona and argued that there is a misunderstanding as to when fair use ends and confidentiality begins. The Bench has instructed the parties to submit written statements within a week and scheduled the next hearing on July 10, 2023.

Analysis

In the abovementioned case, the Delhi High Court has recognised that the test for determining the infringement of the right to publicity aligns with the principles and standards of the tort of passing off. It is now clear that the right to publicity is violated when a third party employs a celebrity’s information, trait, or attribute in a manner that is likely to cause confusion.

The recent appeal against the order of the Single Judge Bench is a testament to the brunt faced by celebrities when Online Fantasy Sports platforms utilise their images to entice audiences. The position of the Hon’ble Court is yet to be determined; however, the mere incidental or transformative use of a celebrity’s name, image, etc. in connection with a product or service cannot be said to be an infringement of the right to publicity. This order has provided precision to Indian jurisprudence on the right to publicity while also emphasising the need to strike a balance between justly enforcing the right to publicity and upholding the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.

Additionally, the court’s decision has the potential to influence the approach of Indian courts in addressing the incorporation of emerging and advanced technologies in our everyday lives. As this field of law is still developing, it remains to be seen whether the Indian judiciary will embrace this trend of engaging with novel concepts.

References:

[1] I.A. 3960/2023

Image Credits:

Photo by Aksonov: https://www.canva.com/photos/MAEJTBLx3xI-cricket-on-laptop-live-broadcast/

The court noted that OFS operators use publicly available player names and images to identify players. Thus, the court ruled that no one can own information in the public domain and such information can’t be monopolised or licensed. Since public domain facts cannot be monopolised, a third party’s use or publication for commercial gain cannot afford the plaintiffs a cause of action. With respect to the remedies available for an aggrieved celebrity, the court only cited defamation as a resort. 

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Authors’ Right to Receive Royalty for Underlying Works Recognised at Last

  • May 29, 2023
  • Mathews V C
  • Muskaan Sawhney

The Bombay High Court recently issued a ruling stating that FM radio stations are required to compensate composers and lyricists for the copyrighted music they broadcast[1]. Through this judgment, the court clarified that after the Copyright Act, 1957 was amended in 2012, making a sound recording available to the public will mean using the musical and literary works that form its foundation.

The longstanding dispute between broadcasters and the authors of underlying works has reached a fair and equitable conclusion, with the latter celebrating the recognition of their rights. In this article, we look at the intricacies involved in the case and analyse the reasoning provided by the court in arriving at its decision.

Case Overview

The Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS), a copyright society, and Music Broadcast Private Limited, a company which owns and operates the radio station “Radio City”, entered into a licence agreement in the year 2001 to employ IPRS’s library of literary and musical works for FM radio broadcast. Akin to this, Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd., which operates the radio station “Radio Tadka”, finalised a radio broadcasting deal with the IPRS in 2006. Subsequently, the Copyright Board of India set a mandatory licence price for radio broadcasting under Section 31(1)(b) of the Act. IPAB set the royalties rate while making decisions concerning applications submitted under Section 31D in 2010. The defendant companies and the IPRS were earlier involved in a legal battle over the rights of authors of original works in case the public becomes aware of sound recordings that consist of these original works. In Music Broadcast Pvt. Ltd. v. IPRS[2], it was held that authors of the original works or the underlying literary and musical works that were included in sound recordings did not have the authority to impede the rights of the owners of those sound recordings to share them with the public through radio broadcast, etc.

The issues raised in the matter include: –

  • Whether the defendant companies are required to provide royalties to IPRS for transmitting musical works to the general public through their FM radio broadcast channels.
  • Whether the modifications adopted in the Copyright Act, which took effect on June 21, 2012, have any bearing on the rights of the creators of original works when those original works are included in sound recordings that are shared with the public.

In Entertainment Network India Ltd. v. Phonographic Performance Limited India and Anr[3], and related matters, the Delhi High Court clarified that the IPAB order remains in effect even while an appeal is pending. The court held that no compensation for the underlying works had been provided since the IPAB order was issued and stated that the respondent is entitled to use any available remedies if the IPAB order is not followed. Afterwards, on October 6, 2021, the court released a notice in the public domain seeking feedback from parties interested in fixing royalty rates concerning the underlying works. In a request for an interim injunction, IPRS alleged that the defendants were broadcasting songs from its catalogue without permission. According to IPRS, the Copyright Act underwent significant revisions addressing the rights of the authors of underlying works after 2012.

Contentions of Parties

The IPRS made thorough arguments to convince the court that the 2012 amendment to the Copyright Act, which took effect on June 21, 2012, had fundamentally altered the Act’s structure and supported the claims made in the lawsuits and the requests for temporary relief. According to the argument, the IPRS, which is seeking interim relief in the current applications, cannot be hindered by the legal position established by the Supreme Court in its 1977 decision in the case of IPRS vs. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures Association and others[4], which the Supreme Court and several High Courts later upheld.

The IPRS drew the Court’s attention to the amendments to Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Copyright Act. Furthermore, the revisions carried a by-product of overturning the legal precedent established by the unaltered Copyright Act, as determined by the Supreme Court in the case of IPRS vs. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures Association and others and subsequent decisions and that the provisions of the unamended Copyright Act had been incorrectly perused by the Supreme Court and erred against the rights of the authors of such underlying works.

On the other hand, the defendant companies asserted that while the Copyright Act has clearly undergone changes since 2012, most of the changes are merely clarifications. It was argued that even if it were true that the revisions were implemented to extend the rights of authors of original works, the objective that the IPRS professes to support had not been achieved. Moreover, the defendants contended that since the 2012 amendment was only clarifying in nature and that since Sections 13 and 14 had not been changed, the adjustment to the other provisions could not have conferred any new substantive rights.

The Verdict

Accepting the contentions of the IPRS, the court stated that the 2012 amendment does “have the effect of creating a substantive right in favour of authors of underlying literary and musical works”. It was pointed out that though Sections 13 and 14 weren’t amended when they were read in conjunction with the amended Sections 17, 18 and 19, it can be seen that there is a “change in position of law brought about in favour of such authors of works”.

In its joint order, the court also concurred with IPRS’s claims that, despite payments made by the broadcasters to the owners of the sound recordings, the broadcast of music by FM radio broadcasters necessitated the payment of royalties in respect of the utilisation of literary and musical works underpinning the sound recordings. In response to the defendants’ claim that sharing the sound recording with the public violates their exclusive right under Section 14(e)(iii) and cannot be interpreted as using the underlying works; the court ruled that sharing the sound recording with the public uses the underlying works because they are integral to the sound recording.

The court held that even though Section 14(e)(iii) does confer an exclusive right upon the defendants to communicate to the public, such exclusive rights are subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act, and on a joint reading of Sections 13(1)(a), Section 13(4), the proviso to Sections 17, third and fourth proviso to Sections 18, and Sections 19(9) and (10) it was interpreted that the exclusive right to communicate sound recordings to the public is dependent on the author’s right to collect royalties.

The court declined to agree that the right to earn royalties would be eliminated because the underlying works are included in the sound recordings because such an interpretation would eliminate the entitlement provided to the authors of the underlying work.

The Bombay High Court concluded that the amendments made to the Copyright Act, 1957 in 2012, which created a substantive right in favour of authors of the underlying literary and musical work, fundamentally altered the legal framework concerning ownership of authors and composers who create lyrics and musical compositions. The court ruled that IPRS is entitled to royalties for the use of literary and musical works included in sound recordings or motion pictures. The court has categorically determined that each time a sound recording is shared with the public through radio stations, it constitutes the utilisation of the underlying literary and musical works for which the authors are entitled to royalties. As a result, the authors of these literary and musical works are qualified to request royalties on each occasion that these sound recordings are shared with the public through radio stations.

Therefore, when a synchronised product (cinematographic film or sound recording) is made publicly available, the creators of those works are entitled to royalties, except for situations when a cinematograph film is shown in a theatre. The defendants have been granted six weeks to comply with the court’s directive and pay the royalties to IPRS in accordance with the order dated December 31, 2020, passed by the former Intellectual Property Appellate Board or else temporary injunctions prohibiting the broadcast of music would take effect.

Outcome

In the Indian copyright system, the problem of royalties faced by creators of the underlying work has been extensively discussed and is the subject of several litigations. There have, however, been undercurrents of a modern interpretation within these orders that held otherwise, disregarding the unanimous nature of these opinions of the law prior to the 2012 revision. The order, as originally intended by the amendment, expressly recognises the rights of the authors of the underlying works. The order underlines a huge incentive to the authors and has received a warm reception from the community. However, the order’s practical ramifications are yet to be determined. The order may be overturned if the appellate authority believes that the IPAB exceeded its power by setting the royalty rates for the underlying work while it is currently pending review.

References:

[1] Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd. (IA No. 9452 of 2022) and Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Music Broadcast Ltd. (IA No. 1213 of 2022)

[2]Suit No.2401 of 2006

[3]C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 3/2021

[4]1977 AIR 1443

Image Credits:

Photo by dotshock: https://www.canva.com/photos/MAAXiQsGTn8-radio-station-microphone/

The Bombay High Court concluded that the amendments made to the Copyright Act, 1957 in 2012, which created a substantive right in favour of authors of the underlying literary and musical work, fundamentally altered the legal framework concerning ownership of authors and composers who create lyrics and musical compositions. The court ruled that IPRS is entitled to royalties for the use of literary and musical works included in sound recordings or motion pictures. The court has categorically determined that each time a sound recording is shared with the public through radio stations, it constitutes the utilisation of the underlying literary and musical works for which the authors are entitled to royalties. As a result, the authors of these literary and musical works are qualified to request royalties on each occasion that these sound recordings are shared with the public through radio stations.

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Intermediaries' Obligation to Pursue Complaints Against Infringers: Analysing the Latest Interpretation

The recent interim order dated March 1, 2023, issued by the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Enterprises vs. Flipkart Internet Private Ltd.[1] had sparked a lot of debate and confusion among the public concerning the liability of an intermediary. As per the order of the High Court, an intermediary is not obligated to take action in cases of infringement reported by their users. The Hon’ble Court delved deeply into the interpretation of Rule 3 of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, on the question of whether there exists an obligation on the part of intermediaries to act on complaints against infringers.   

Facts

The plaintiff was in the business of manufacturing and selling car covers under the marks “UK Blue” and “Autofact” and had been selling them on Flipkart since 2018. The plaintiff happened to notice that some other entities started to copy their designs, looks and marketing strategies on the Flipkart platform itself. Apart from the fact that the covers were identical, the infringers also sold these covers in a fashion similar to that of the plaintiff’s company to create confusion and boost their sales.

The plaintiff had informed and reported to Flipkart about the infringement of their products by placing screenshots and other similar evidences of infringement committed by the infringer on record. The platform refused to take any action against the infringers and advised the plaintiff to approach a court of law for redressal of IPR disputes.

The plaintiff approached the Delhi High Court, citing that Flipkart cannot act as an intermediary if it fails to adhere to its obligations as an intermediary and to observe important due diligence mandated by Rule 3(2) of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.

Law Involved

Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) requires intermediaries to inform their users of their privacy policy, rules and regulations and user agreement and shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that any information that infringes any patent, copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights shall not be hosted, displayed, uploaded, modified, published, transmitted, stored, updated, or shared by the intermediary.

Rule 3(2)(a) of the IT rules requires the intermediary to publish on its website the details of the grievance officer and the mechanism by which a user could complain about any possible violations. Further, it requires the officer to acknowledge the complaint within 24 hours and resolve the issue within a period of 15 days.  

The plaintiff relied on these two sections to further their claim of infringement against Flipkart. 

Rule 3 (2)(1) (proviso) provides for intermediaries to acknowledge any complaint within 24 hours and resolve all such complaints within 15 days from their receipt. Moreover, the proviso also calls upon the intermediary to develop appropriate safeguards to avoid any misuse by users.

The Ruling

The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that Rule 3(2)(a) only envisages complaints regarding violations of the obligation imposed on the intermediary under the rules. There is no scope for the intermediary to take any kind of action against the infringer upon receipt of the complaint. The same argument was also put forth by the court when the question surrounding Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) was raised, and the court clarified that the rule merely provides for intermediaries to inform users not to display or host infringing content. The rule does not mandate or require the intermediary to take any action upon receipt of the complaint of infringement.   

The Hon’ble Court stated that it cannot read into IT rules something that the rules do not contain expressly or by necessary implication. It further said that, “where the applicable statutory rules do not envisage action being taken by an intermediary merely on the complaint being made by an aggrieved victim or user regarding infringement of intellectual property rights, by content posted on the platform of the intermediary, the court cannot, by placing reliance on an internal policy of a particular intermediary, read into Clause 3 any such requirement, especially where such a provision existed in the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and has consciously been omitted in the 2021 Rules”.  

The Hon’ble Court was of the opinion that the complaint against Flipkart that it is not taking action does not appear to be sustainable due to the above-mentioned reasons. However, a prima facie case of copyright violation was made out by the court and in order to protect the plaintiff from any further damages, an interlocutory injunction was granted against listing the alleged infringing content.

General Observations 

Though the Hon’ble Court did grant the injunction to protect the plaintiff from the ongoing infringement occurring on the platform, the main essence of the IT Act and rules was not taken into consideration while discharging Flipkart of any liability.

The plaintiff erred in not considering the many precedents laid by this very same court. For instance, in Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. vs. Myspace Inc. & Anr1, the court said that “I find that there is no impact of the provisions of Section 79 of the IT Act (as amended in 2009) on copyright infringements relating to internet wrongs where intermediaries are involved and the said provision cannot curtail the rights of the copyright owner by operation of the proviso of Section 81 which carves out an exception for cases relating to copyright or patent infringement”. 

The case witnessed that the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, overrode the provision of the safe harbour granted by the IT Act under Section 79. The Hon’ble Court relied on Section 81 of the IT Act, which provides for an exemption for people exercising their rights under the Copyright Act and the Patent Act. The Hon’ble Court should have recognised this precedent and acknowledged the obligation it posed to the intermediary to remove such infringing products from its platform.   

It doesn’t end here. The court should have considered in what instance the immunity available for intermediaries will be impacted under Section 79 of the IT Act. Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act states that upon receiving actual knowledge of an unlawful act connected to the computer resource controlled by the intermediary, the intermediary shall expeditiously remove or disable access to such infringing material. If such action is not undertaken by the intermediary, it shall lose the safe harbour guaranteed by Section 79. If safe harbour protection is not available, then allowing an infringement to take place on their platform may constitute abetment and unlawful activity which in turn would make them liable under the law of the land.  

Another striking part of the order is that, even though the Hon’ble Court completely relied on the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the court failed to read into Rule 3 (2) (1) of the IT Rules 2021. The proviso of the rule clearly stipulates that any complaint received from the user other than under Subclauses (i), (iv), and (ix) needs to be expeditiously resolved within 72 hours by the grievance officer. That does not take away the primary obligation of the intermediary to act within the 15 days mandated in the main provision in relation to such excluded matters, including cases of IP infringement. It is astonishing that the court or the parties gave more emphasis to the proviso than the main clause under Rule 3(2)(a)(i). 

Initially, Rule 3(2)(b) was worded as follows: “(i) acknowledge the complaint within twenty-four hours and dispose off such complaint within a period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt;  

(ii) receive and acknowledge any order, notice or direction issued by the Appropriate Government, any competent authority or a court of competent jurisdiction.”.   

On October 28, 2022, the government amended the above rule to read as follows: “acknowledge the complaint within twenty-four hours and resolve such complaint within a period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt: 

Provided that the complaint in the nature of request for removal of information or communication link relating to clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 3, except sub-clauses (i), (iv) and (ix), shall be acted upon as expeditiously as possible and shall be resolved within seventy-two hours of such reporting;  

Provided further that appropriate safeguards may be developed by the intermediary to avoid any misuse by users;” 

The intention of this amendment is to prescribe faster action for certain kinds of wrongdoings and expect them to act within 72 hours. At the same time, for those others (sub-clauses (i), (iv) and (ix)) the original time frame of 15 days for taking action remains. Without a doubt, the goal of this amendment is not to encourage platform users to behave irresponsibly or complacently despite being aware that the platform is frequently used to violate intellectual property rights. It merely provides them with sufficient time and excludes the requirement of compliance within 72 hours.

The intermediary is still obligated to undertake the due diligence described in Rule 3(1)(b)(iv), and if they do not do so and do not take action within fifteen days even after becoming aware of the infringement, the immunity from liability specified in Section 79 will end. The safe harbour will be eliminated because the proviso to Section 81 of the IT Act clearly indicates that IP rights are to be expected to be protected by the intermediary.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Court was right in granting the injunction in favour of the plaintiff to restrain Flipkart from allowing such infringing products on their platforms.

However, the Hon’ble Court erred by not making a harmonious reading of Rule 3 (2) (a) of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, with Section 79 (3) (b) and the proviso to Section 81 of the IT Act. An isolated reading of the provision and discharging Flipkart of their liability under the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 seems to be an oversight.

The proviso appended to the said section provides that nothing contained in this act shall restrict the exercising of any right by any person under the Copyright Act. This, along with Section 79 (3) of the IT Act, mandates the intermediary not to conspire, abet or aid any infringement and to remove the infringing material on receiving actual knowledge of it.  

The above-referred order will only help the intermediaries and platforms to behave irresponsibly and indifferently even when an intellectual property owner notifies them of infringement on their platforms. It compels aggrieved intellectual property owners to initiate legal action for every infringement, which is expensive to carry out. IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, was primarily made to make the platforms more responsible and ethical. Allowing them to act irresponsibly through a limited interpretation of law is unconscionable.

References:

1. CS (COMM) 63/2023

The recent interim order dated March 1, 2023, issued by the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Enterprises vs. Flipkart Internet Private Ltd. (CS (COMM) 63/2023) had sparked a lot of debate and confusion among the public concerning the liability of an intermediary. Though the Hon’ble Court did grant the injunction to protect the plaintiff from the on-going infringement occurring on the platform, the main essence of the IT Act and rules was not taken into consideration while discharging Flipkart of any liability.

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Online Gaming: Challenges in Protection of Intellectual Property

  • February 13, 2023
  • Mathews V C

IP protection is a crucial aspect of the gaming industry as it helps game developers in protecting their creations and ensures that they receive appropriate recognition and adequate compensation for their work. However, protecting IP rights can prove difficult in the digital world, especially in countries where IP laws are weak or nonexistent.

Introduction

The gaming industry in India has been growing and evolving rapidly over the past few years. According to estimates, the Indian gaming industry was valued at approximately US$1.1 billion in 2020 and is expected to reach US$2.1 billion by the end of this year. The massive growth in this domain could be attributed to the increase in smartphone use, growing middle-class population, easy access to high-speed internet connections, rise in disposable income, expansion of e-commerce, and extensive use of online modes of payments. These factors enable companies and investors to tap into opportunities offered by the industry.

The mobile gaming segment, which accounts for more than 70% of the total market value, is the largest and fastest-growing segment of the country’s gaming industry. Moreover, the esports market is proliferating, driven by investments and recognition of esports as a competitive sport.

Challenges Faced by Game Developers

The exponential progress in the field of gaming has brought about numerous challenges such as complications involved in the protection of Intellectual Property (IP), game cloning issues, etc. With the rise of digital distribution, it has become easier for rogue companies to copy popular games and market them as their own, thereby infringing on the original game’s IP and reputation.

One of the biggest challenges in protecting IP in online gaming is the issue of game cloning. Game cloning occurs when one company creates a copy of another company’s game and markets it as its own. This not only infringes on the original game’s IP, but it can also harm the reputation of the original game and the company behind it. Game cloning is particularly prevalent in the mobile gaming industry, where the low barriers to entry and the ease of access to development tools make it simple for companies to create a copy of a popular game. Game cloning may confuse consumers or users, resulting in a loss of revenue for the original game’s developers. Such cloning also harms the reputation of the original game. In some cases, game cloning can also lead to negative reviews and decreased ratings for the original game, further impacting its business performance and success.

Another challenge in protecting IP in online gaming is the issue of piracy. With digital games, it is easy for users to obtain and share illegal copies of the game, which can result in lost revenue for the game’s creators. This is particularly problematic for smaller game developers, who may not have the resources to invest in anti-piracy measures. While some companies have attempted to use digital rights management (DRM) technology to prevent piracy, this can also make the game less accessible for legitimate users and can result in technical issues.

Protection of Intellectual Property

To combat the challenges of protecting IP in online gaming, game developers can take several steps. Firstly, they can register their IP, including trademarks and copyrights, to have a more robust legal standing in the event of an infringement. Additionally, game developers can invest in anti-piracy measures, such as DRM technology, to prevent the illegal distribution of their games.

Another way to protect IP in online gaming is by enlisting the help of the gaming community and collaborating with its members. Game developers can work with players to report game cloning and piracy instances, allowing them to take swift action to protect their IP. Additionally, game developers can engage with players to gather feedback and improve their games, creating a loyal and engaged community invested in the game’s success.

Conclusion

Though the challenges of protecting IP in online gaming are complex and multi-faceted, game developers can mitigate these challenges and ensure the success of their games through IP registration, anti-piracy measures, collaborating with members of the gaming community, etc. The gaming industry is constantly evolving, and the challenges of protecting IP in online gaming will continue to change. In this rapidly changing marketplace, game developers must be proactive in protecting their IP to remain competitive and receive the recognition and compensation they deserve.

Image Credits:

Photo by Ron Lach : https://www.pexels.com/photo/group-of-teenagers-watching-a-man-play-game-on-computer-7849517/

Though the challenges of protecting IP in online gaming are complex and multi-faceted, game developers can mitigate these challenges and ensure the success of their games through IP registration, anti-piracy measures, collaborating with members of the gaming community, etc. The gaming industry is constantly evolving, and the challenges of protecting IP in online gaming will continue to change. In this rapidly changing marketplace, game developers must be proactive in protecting their IP to remain competitive and receive the recognition and compensation they deserve.

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A Perceptive Study of Indian Jurisprudence on the Religious Susceptibility Clause of Trademarks Law

Religion, since time immemorial, has influenced Indian law and society on a political, cultural, and economic level. The country’s rich religious and cultural history has, over the years, been both revered and celebrated around the world.

Our architecture, holy books, epics, symbols, and homonyms all reflect the country’s diverse and rich heritage that encompasses religion. The Indian Constitution further complements this heritage by vesting its citizens with the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate their religion under Articles 25-28,[1] subject to reasonable restrictions.

It is safe to say that religion is deeply intrinsic to Indian society, and inevitably, it has seeped through every facet of the Indian lifestyle, including trade and commerce. Religion, in India, is a sensitive subject, and the use of names of Gods and Goddesses, religious writings, figurines, and scriptures is subject to certain reasonable restrictions under the Indian Constitution as well as other domestic laws, including the trademark law.

Hence, while not entirely forbidden, the proliferation of hypersensitivity with respect to religion and religious scriptures and symbols dictates the jurisprudence around the usage of such marks under the Indian trademark law.

Trademark Law and the Bar of Religion

The use of religious symbols and figurines in commerce and business to draw clients has, over the year, proven to be an effective strategy to encourage growth, considering individuals place a high value on religious symbols and have a solid emotional and spiritual tie to items affiliated with their faith. Such usage, however, is also characterised by the nature of goods and services and the morality or immorality tag duly attached to said goods and services in contemporary society.

Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 stipulates Absolute Grounds for Refusal of Registration of a trademark.[2] Consequently, Section 9(2)(b)[3] specifically places certain restrictions on the registration of marks that are likely to hurt or insult the religious sensibilities of any class or section of society.

Additionally, the Manual of Trade Marks, Practice and Procedure by the Central Government,[4] in consonance with the provision as has been prescribed under Section 23(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999,[5] further enumerates a list of notified prohibited trademarks which includes, interalia:

  • Words “Lord Buddha”, “Shree Sai Baba”, “Sri Ramkrishna”, “Swami Vivekananda”, “the Holy Mother alias Sri Sarada Devi”, “Balaji” or their devices and the Emblems of the Ramkrishna Math and Mission or colourable imitation thereof; or
  • Names and pictures of Sikh Gurus, viz. Guru Nanak, Guru Angad, Guru Amar Das, Guru Ram Das, Guru Arjun Dev, Guru Hargobind, Guru Har Raj, Guru Harkrishnan, Guru Tegh Bahadur and Guru Govind Singh;
  • Name and picture of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj;
  • Name and/or picture of the deity of Lord Venkateswara and/or Balaji.

Indian Jurisprudence and the Contours of Religious Susceptibility

The use of names of Gods or Goddesses, religious symbols or figurines per se is not prohibited under the provisions of the Trademarks Act, 1999.[6] In Vishnu Cement v. B.S. Cement Private Ltd.,[7] for instance, the word “VISHNU” was granted registration in the absence of any device of Lord Vishnu, associated with the word mark, by associating the word mark with a personal name, and not a religious sentiment. Again, in Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. District Judge,[8] a relatively liberal approach was taken by the Allahabad High Court in allowing the proprietor to use the trademark ‘GANESHA’ on beedi packets.

However, such usage in relation to certain goods or services may offend the religious sentiments of certain sections of society. In these situations, such marks would fall within the ambit of marks not eligible for registration. For instance, a trademark carrying the name and image of Goddess Meenakshi regarding fertilisers and manure was revoked under the erstwhile 1958 Act.[9] Similarly, in Amritpal Singh v. Lal Babu Priyadarshi[10] the mark RAMAYANA was found incapable of registration. The case acted as the first instance of a blanket restriction being imposed on the registration of the name of a religious book by interpreting the provisions under Section 9(2)(b) of the Trademarks Act, 1999, stricto sensu.

Interestingly, in all these cases, the courts have cited the need to prevent the monopolisation of names of gods and religious symbols and figurines, adding that these words lack enough distinctiveness and merely qualify as common words, which should not be allowed for registration. The Bombay High Court recently refused registration to the word “LAXMI,” citing the aforementioned, on the grounds that it was a common name and thus lacked any distinctiveness to merit registration.[11]   

It is pertinent to note from the aforesaid that the courts have refrained from defining strictly measurable thresholds when it comes to dealing with marks that might have a religious connotation, which is fair and understandable to an extent, considering the sensitive nature of such cases. However, the lack of consistency in the reasoning cited behind these decisions has raised some eyebrows, and the conflicting decisions have left much to be desired.

More recently, the Kerela High Court granted the Attukal Bhagawathy Temple Trust the registration of the “picture of Attukal Deity” and the title “Sabarimala of Women” under Class 42 – a residuary clause (for temple services, social services, welfare services, and cultural activities), citing the need to “prevent unauthorised use of the deity’s picture and title.”[12] The case stands as one of a kind, where a temple trust has been granted registration for carrying out services corresponding to the temple and in the name of a particular religion and goddess, thereby risking the exclusion of an entire sect of devotees from using the picture and title of their beloved deity.

While the grant of such a registration might be in contravention of Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, the decision also sets out a dangerous precedent, risking the monopolisation and commercialisation of services and other activities carried out in the name of faith, which is in stark contrast to the general position portrayed under the Trademarks Act, 1999, and the spirit of secularism as a whole.

 

Conclusion

While the intention behind the courts not defining a straight-jacket formula while dealing with marks that might have a religious connotation is laudable, considering the sensitive nature of such cases, the inconsistency behind the reasoning cited in some of these cases leaves a lot to be desired.

The use of names of Gods, Goddesses, religious writings, figurines, and scriptures is generally publici juris,[13] and registration of the aforesaid should be allowed only in exceptional cases where the prima facie evidence in favour of the usage by the proprietor is so strong in the public mind that the mark could be deemed to have garnered secondary distinctiveness, to the exclusion of all other parties, bar the proprietor.

No doubt, commercial interest forms the cornerstone of business in the contemporary world, but it’s important to remember that religion and business often don’t go hand in hand, and such commercial interest shouldn’t come at the cost of compromising the religious sentiments of the masses.

References:

[1] India Const. Arts. 25-28.

[2] The Trade Marks Act, No. 47 of 1999. India Code, § 9.

[3] The Trade Marks Act, No. 47 of 1999. India Code, § 9(2)(b).

[4] Manual of Trade Marks, Practice and Procedure by the Central Government, accessible at:  https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOGuidelinesManuals/1_32_1_tmr-draft-manual.pdf.

[5] The Trade Marks Act, No. 47 of 1999. India Code, § 23(1).

[6] S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (India). See also, Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 555 (India).

[7] Vishnu Cement v. B.S. Cement Private Ltd., 1998 (18) PTC 130 (India).

[8] Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India, (1974) 4 SCC 43 (India).

[9] Sri Meenakshi Tamil Nadu Appl. 1976 IPLR 144 (India).

[10] Amritpal Singh v. Lal Babu Priyadarshi, (2015) 16 SCC 795 (India).

[11] Freudenberg Gala Household Product Pvt. Ltd. v. GEBI Products, MANU/MH/1859/2017 (India). See also, OM Logistics Ltd. v. Mahendra Pandey, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 757 (India) [Registration for the term ‘OM’, was refused] & Shree Ganesh Besan Mills v. Ganesh Grains Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 3068 (India) [Registration for the term ‘GANESH’, was refused].

[12] Suo motu Proceedings v. Controller General of Patents, Design and Trademarks, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 24367 (India).

[13] Bhole Baba Milk Food Industries Ltd. v. Parul Food Specialities Pvt. Ltd., CS (OS) No. 107/2010 (India). 

It is safe to say that religion is deeply intrinsic to Indian society, and inevitably, it has seeped through every facet of the Indian lifestyle, including trade and commerce. Religion, in India, is a sensitive subject, and the use of names of Gods and Goddesses, religious writings, figurines, and scriptures is subject to certain reasonable restrictions under the Indian Constitution as well as other domestic laws, including the trademark law.

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Art Meets Law: The Uneasy Tussle of Street Art and Intellectual Property Law

Art-making in public spaces is a 2000-year-old tradition in India. The oldest evidence of painting in communal places can be traced to the Buddhist cave paintings in Ajanta, Maharashtra. The mode of expression and manifestation of these art forms has been unique. For example, folk art on the exterior walls of homes, hand-painted Bollywood posters on walls, truck art, slogans, and many more. Street art is a combination of all of these. Street art is a broad term that encompasses spray painting graffiti, political graffiti murals, (un)sanctioned wall art, and other art forms. Despite concurrent pronouncements on the legal status of graffiti and other art forms, several concerns have arisen about their commercial use and protection under Intellectual Property law.

The medium of expression for a street artist is more often someone else’s property without the permission or knowledge of the owner. In its most unadulterated form, street art opposes authority and the law. On either private or public property, it is usually art made without permission and in violation of the law. Street art embraces metropolitan walls and streets, gifting the public with innovative visual imagery that becomes a part of the city as much as the wall it rests on. Perhaps one of the most rapidly expanding artistic movements is graffiti. Though India has not been much into this, the new era is for something different.

There has been a gradual increase in the number of street artists in India, namely, Yantra and Leena Kejriwal, and internationally there is Banksy and Manu Invisible. Graffiti art has evolved over the past several years from being disregarded as a nuisance and equated with vandalism. Even after the many surrounding conjectures, it has been gauged to be a legitimate form of art and a sought-after commodity among art collectors and enthusiasts. Since graffiti is on the verge of becoming the next big art market, it is grappling with questions of intellectual property protection on creation, unauthorised copying, and destruction.

 

Copyright in Street Art

 

In all its forms, street art has recently gained enormous popularity and is typically not seen as a nuisance to the property. It has instead developed into a highly marketable commodity throughout the world. To clarify a few supplementary terms, “street art” is an umbrella term for artwork produced in a public area.[1] On the other hand, graffiti describes the application of spray paint to surfaces to produce images or different designs. Despite being used in many commercial endeavours, such as fashion brands and advertising campaigns, the law has not recognised it as art. So, the question remains whether it may be extended to copyright protection.

For a work to be qualified for copyright protection, it must be original, reduced to material form, and showcase creativity. Graffiti meets these criteria since it is artistic and fixed in a physical medium of expression. Technically, copyright exists as soon as it is created, so there shouldn’t be any formal requirement for the aforementioned conditions to be met. Other exclusive rights are solely available to the author of the work. For instance, they can publish or authorise the publication of their work, reproduce or authorise the replication of their work, and include or authorise the inclusion of their work in a cinematographic film or T.V. broadcast.

In the Indian scenario, any street art will fall under section 2(y) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (“Act”). Furthermore, as per section 2(c) of the Act, these street arts will also fall under the purview of artistic work. As stated above, copyright protection to subsist in work primarily needs to be original. There is no definition of “original” in the Act, but in the trade, it is assumed that an idea cannot be copyrighted until it has been expressed and is unique in its truest sense. The courts have tried to ascertain originality through various judgements, the most important being University of London Press Ltd. v. Tutorial Press Ltd.[2] In this case, the Court relied on the ‘Sweat of the Brow’ doctrine and observed that the work need not be original in a revolutionary way. However, it should not be of a trivial nature either. Certain efforts must be made to ascertain whether it is original. Further, the “Modicum of Creativity” test stipulates that the work must involve minimal originality to be authentic and copyrightable.

It has often been observed that street art is often plagiarised without permission, taking advantage of the loophole, i.e., the lack of clarity in the law that extends to the protection of such work. It is imperative to understand that whatever the medium, the artist employs skill and labour. The art depicts artistic value and creativity, with the medium typically being a fixed, tangible building surface. Thus, street art should fall under the protection of copyright law.

 

Street Art- Neither Illegal nor Immoral

 

Copyright has two conditions, as indicated above: the work must be unique and created on a specific tangible medium. However, there is a significant flaw because the rules do not address the type of artistic production that may be immoral or in conflict with the law. This raises the question of what would happen if someone stole a pen and drew a captivating portrait on paper or stole a camera and took a stunning photo. The apparent query is whether A and B can both request copyright protection. But the fundamental question is: given that their work is the result of theft, should such stolen works be entitled to protection? In theory, the response should be affirmative. Yes, the portrait and the image should be covered by copyright protection.

Although, in reality, graffiti art is inherently in conflict with the law, through a particular style or identifying tags, the creator of that artwork is easily identifiable. The Copyright Act of 1957 does not specify any requirements relating to the substance of a work other than originality for copyright to exist in the work. Graffiti is a stationary original artistic work of authorship that should be eligible for protection under “painting, graphic, drawing, and sculptural works”, according to a straightforward interpretation of sections 2(y) and 13 taken together. The Trade Marks Act of 1999 and the Patents Act of 1970, which forbid the protection of marks or inventions based on standards like obscenity and morality, contrast this. Therefore, it is abundantly evident what the legislative objective was, and the denial of copyright protection for illegal works was not intended.

There have been theories that graffiti should be excluded from copyright protection because they stand on the fact that the law should not impede social justice and that these artworks are immoral. Contrarily, the author holds that what is immoral does not necessarily mean it is illegal. Graffiti always depicts an idea or message that is legal and should not in any way be considered criminal. It is pertinent to notice the intent behind such an artwork and how it proves instrumental in benefiting society.

 

Protection from (Mis)Appropriation

 

The graffiti movement in India is in a very nascent stage and has not seen many judicial precedents. There have been instances where artwork has been done on the wall of a property, or original artwork has been appropriated, but these cases have not come up for adjudication by the courts. We shall understand appropriation art through the same case-moot points of copyright protection.

Let’s say that X noticed some graffiti on the side of a building and decided to take it as his own. The graffiti artist Y accuses X of violating his copyright. In Court, X asserts that Y violated property law and tort law by defacing the property, causing vandalism, and engaging in trespass while creating the unauthorised art. However, X will be a violator if the Court decides that the graffiti work was copyrighted. It is the doctrine of equitable defence. The party to a litigation who has acted reasonably and honestly can avail itself of defence in equity. And the person guilty of violating or infringing on someone’s right cannot be supported by it. In Tekla Corporations & Anr v. Survo Ghosh & Anr,[3] the Court considered whether an equitable defence is available to a copyright infringer. X, who violated Y’s right, may claim there was a violation. However, Y is not entitled to act against him because Y defaced the property wall and violated another law. The Delhi High Court decided in the negative. Therefore, the defence of unclean hands would fail if the graffiti is found copyrightable and the defendant is observed to be infringing the copyright.

The incentive-based theory is recognised as the primary defence of copyright by the Indian I.P. regime. The Indian Copyright Law’s immediate result is to ensure a just reward for the author’s labour. Still, its goal is to foster artistic creativity for the benefit of all people by providing this incentive. For instance, the United States Supreme Court stated that copyright’s monopoly privileges are “intended to encourage the creative work of authors as well as inventors by the provision of a special reward” in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. According to the incentive-based argument, authors will stop producing new works if free riders are permitted to appropriate others’ works. Copyright protection is required, as it relates to the graffiti movement, to motivate artists to produce more graffiti without the free-riders.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed this claim in the case of Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., noting that street art has developed into much more than spray-painted tags and quickly disappearing bits adorned by rebellious urbanites, which is entitled to copyright protection.

Conclusion

Though the street artwork movement in India is at a snail’s pace, we must follow the covenants of international treaties to answer any dissecting viewpoints. The purpose of copyright should be the promotion of art, the free flow of creativity, and, consequently, the progress of society. These principles are primarily upheld by the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. It mandates that copyright protection be established upon the creation of the work with no need for formalities (such as registration), thus excluding any room for scrutiny of the work and/or evaluation of whether its content or creation process deserves copyright protection. Moreover, the Guide to the Berne Convention states that the work’s value, merit, or purpose is irrelevant to the enjoyment and exercise of copyright and emphasises the all-embracing copyright protection of all works, regardless of the manner or form of their expression.

It is crucial to understand that, even though it is not explicitly stated, the jurisprudence surrounding copyright is largely based on the theory of personality rights, which includes the author’s moral rights as stated in the Berne Convention as well as acknowledged by Indian copyright law. Since India is a signatory, if a case of similar stature arises, these treaties’ reasoning and analytical viewpoint will serve well in the Indian copyright context.

References: 

[1] Graffiti: At The Edge Of Copyright By Jonathan Bailey March 15, 2018 https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2018/03/15/graffiti-at-the-edge-of-copyright/

[2] [1916] 2 Ch. 601

[3] CS(OS) 2414/2011

Image Credits: Photo by Samuel Regan-Asante on Unsplash

Though the street artwork movement in India is at a snail’s pace, we must follow the covenants of international treaties to answer any dissecting viewpoints. The purpose of copyright should be the promotion of art, the free flow of creativity, and, consequently, the progress of society. These principles are primarily upheld by the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. It mandates that copyright protection be established upon the creation of the work with no need for formalities (such as registration), thus excluding any room for scrutiny of the work and/or evaluation of whether its content or creation process deserves copyright protection.

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Gems vs James Bond: Delhi High Court Rules in Favour of Cadbury

In a long-pending case of trademark infringement dispute between Mondelez Indian Foods Pvt. Ltd, formerly Cadbury India Limited (Plaintiff) and Neeraj Food Products (Defendants), the Delhi High Court issued a permanent and mandatory injunction against the Defendant for trading “James Bond”- a chocolate product which bore deceptive similarity to Cadbury’s trademark “Gems”. The Court also imposed a fine of INR 15 Lakhs on the defendant for the copyright infringement.

The lawsuit was filed in August 2005 against the defendant, the sole proprietorship of Mr. Charan Das. Plaintiff 1– Cadbury India Ltd. and Plaintiff 2– Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Limited claimed ownership of the mark ‘CADBURY GEMS’ or ‘GEMS’. The Plaintiffs claim that the defendant launched a chocolate product under the name ‘JAMES BOND’ with the identical colour scheme, layout, and arrangement as the ‘CADBURY GEMS’ or ‘GEMS’ products.

Further, the Plaintiffs also claimed that the product “James Bond” also stood in infringement of the copyright and trademark registration, under its former name, Hindustan Cocoa Products Ltd., bearing registration numbers A-50680/90 and A-49975/89 in respect to a character referred to as “Gems Bond”, often used in various marketing campaigns of their product.

                                           Figure: Packaging of Cadbury Gems and James Bond[1]

Hence, the lawsuit sought a permanent and mandatory injunction and damages for trademark and copyright infringement, passing off, unfair competition and other relief.

The Court observed that the packaging of the Plaintiffs’ ‘GEMS’ product is very unique, with illustrations of colourful button chocolates on a blue/purple base with the mark ‘GEMS’ depicted in a number of colours and a splash in the middle, which is very well known to the young and the old alike.

Numerous “GEMS” advertisements feature the phrase “GEMS BOND,” and some examples have also been made public. The defendant’s packaging features colourful button chocolates and the mark “JAMES BOND”/”JAMEY BOND” with the same blue/purple foundation. The trademark “GEMS” appears on a brown background on both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s products. The label and packaging for the Plaintiffs’ product share the same colour palette as the Defendant’s product. Additionally, the marks are misleadingly and confusingly similar. Therefore, the court categorised the situation as an instance of res ipsa loquitur.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., (1960) 1 SCR 968 and Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore, in which the contention of the test of infringement and deceptive similarity of competing marks (1972) 1 SCC 618 was settled, wherein it was observed that “the overall structural and phonetic similarity and the similarity of the idea in the two marks is reasonably likely to cause a confusion between them and the Court has to see the similarities and not the dissimilarities.”

The Court also placed reliance on the decision of ITC Ltd. v. Britannia Industries Ltd. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5004, in which it was observed that “Where the product is eatable like a biscuit, the colour and the colour scheme of the packaging play an important role in the consumer making an initial choice and in enabling a discerning consumer to locate the particular brand of a manufacturer.”

Further, while discussing the concept of ‘initial interest in the same judgment, the Court relied on Baker Hughes Limited v. Hiroo Khushalani, while observing, “In some cases, however, it is also possible that a purchaser, after having been misled into an initial interest in a product manufactured by an imitator, discovers his folly, but this initial interest, being based on confusion and deception, can give rise to a cause of action for the tort of passing off as the purchaser has been made to think that there is some connection or nexus between the products and business of two disparate companies.”

However, that may not be entirely true when it comes to products like biscuits. The packaging of a biscuit does become associated with the manufacturer or brand. The colour of the wrapper would certainly play an important role.

In the present case, the Court opined, inter alia, that the product- ‘GEMS’ is also usually liked and consumed by small children in both urban and rural areas. Therefore, in such a case, the test shall not be limited to that of absolute confusion, but even the likelihood of confusion shall be deemed sufficient. Hence, the product’s layout and the colour combination of the packaging play a vital role when making a purchase. Moreover, chocolates are not merely sold in retail stores or outlets but also at roadside shacks, paan shops, patri vendors, kirana stores and stalls outside schools, etc. Thus, considering that the class of consumers the product is targeted at is children, the likelihood of confusion stands high.

In conclusion, it can be inferred by the Delhi High Court’s decision that the test for the likelihood of confusion stands on several factors, including the product category in dispute and the consumer demographic it appeals to. As observed by the Court, ‘almost everyone’s childhood is associated with Cadbury Gems’; the product was popular amongst many consumers of all ages and across socio-economic backgrounds. Further, the strikingly similar colour scheme of the packets and layouts and the phonetic sounds of the two products were enough to inspire a “likelihood of confusion” at the point of purchase by the consumer, which led the Court to take a firm stand in favour of the Plaintiff.

References: 

[1] https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pms26072022sc3932018182501-427663.pdf

Image Credits: Photo by Hans Schwarzkopf from Pixabay 

It can be inferred by the Delhi High Court’s decision that the test for the likelihood of confusion stands on several factors, including the product category in dispute and the consumer demographic it appeals to. As observed by the Court, ‘almost everyone’s childhood is associated with Cadbury Gems’; the product was popular amongst many consumers of all ages and across socio-economic backgrounds.

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Marrakesh Treaty: Making Literature Accessible to All

There are over 2.2 billion people blind or visually impaired worldwide, and about 90% of them live in developing or least developed countries. Considering their economic situation and available infrastructure, education and access to the literature are significant issues. Only less than 10% of books published every year are available in a format accessible to them.

Without access to books and magazines, the visually impaired cannot receive the required education or realise their full potential. With a single objective to increase access to books, magazines, and other printed materials for people with print disabilities, the Marrakesh Treaty was adopted by the member states of WIPO in 2013 (the “Treaty”), which also forms part of the body of international copyright treaties administered by WIPO.

 

How did the Marrakesh Treaty Eventuate?

 

In 2006, the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights’ Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, led by Judith Sullivan, set the ball rolling for copyright exceptions for the benefit of the visually impaired. This move prompted many states to make exceptions to their copyright law.

Following that, a proposal for the Treaty was first tabled before the WIPO by Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay for the World Blind Union (WBU) during WIPO’s 18th Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) in 2009. The proposed Treaty set forth minimum standards of copyright exceptions and facilitated the cross-border exchange of accessible formats. Consequently, the Forty-Second WIPO General Assembly decided to convene a Diplomatic Conference on limitations and exceptions for visually impaired persons/persons with print disabilities in June 2013.

The Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities, was held from 17th to 28th June 2013 in Marrakesh, Morocco, which adopted the Treaty on 27th June 2013. The Treaty aligns with the human rights principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).

India became the first country to ratify the Treaty on 24th July 2014. The Treaty received 79 signatures in the first twelve months that it was open for signatures, and it entered into force on 30th September 2016 currently with 80 Contracting Parties on board.

 

Salient Features of the Marrakesh Treaty

 

Definitions Under the Marrakesh Treaty:

“Works” are defined to mean literary and artistic works within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.

“Beneficiary Persons” is defined as someone affected by one or more in a range of disabilities that interfere with the effective reading of printed material. This definition includes visually impaired persons and those with a physical disability that prevents them from holding and manipulating a book.

The definition of “Accessible format copy” is broad and covers any format that permits a person with a visual impairment or other print disability to access the content as feasibly and comfortably as a person without such a disability, including digital formats. The accessible format copy is used exclusively by beneficiary persons. It must respect the integrity of the original work, taking due consideration the changes needed to make the work accessible in the alternative format and the accessibility needs of the beneficiary persons.

“Authorised entity” is defined as an entity authorized or recognized by the government to provide education, instructional training, etc., to beneficiary persons on a non-profit basis. It also includes a government institution or non-profit organization that provides the same services to beneficiary persons as one of its primary activities or institutional obligations.

 

Obligations of the Member Countries Under the Marrakesh Treaty:

 

Article 4 of the Treaty refers to the obligation of the contracting parties to fulfill two primary obligations, i.e.:

  1. Contracting Parties shall provide in their national copyright laws for a limitation or exception to the right of reproduction, the right of distribution, and the right of making available to the public as provided by the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT); and
  2. To facilitate the availability of works in accessible format copies for beneficiary persons.

These limitations and exceptions mean that a range of acts is permitted without infringing copyright.

Article 5 highlights the obligation about the Cross-Border Exchange of Accessible Format Copies. As per this article, all contracting Parties shall have a necessary provision in their Statutes wherein if an accessible format copy is made under a limitation or exception or according to the operation of law, that accessible format copy may be distributed or made available by an authorized entity to a beneficiary person or an authorized entity in another Contracting Party.

 

Application of the Marrakesh Treaty in India

 

The Copyright Act (Amendment) Act 2012, which was enacted in India much before the Treaty was adopted, had already incorporated a provision which grants the exception of fair dealing with the reproduction, distribution, and making available of published works in accessible formats for the disabled.

 

The 2012 Amendment of Fair Dealing Exception

 

The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 provides certain exceptions to copyright infringement as fair dealing under Section 52. The provision permits limited use of copyright material without the owner’s authorization.

The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 brought a new provision under Section 52(1) (ZB), which made conversions of work into an accessible format for the exclusive benefit of disabled persons a fair dealing exception to the infringement of copyright. This extends to the adaptation, reproduction, issue of copies, or communication to the public of any work in an accessible format for persons with disabilities, by any person or organisation working for the benefit of the persons with disabilities.

Section [(zb) 52] highlights that the; adaptation, reproduction, issue of copies or communication to the public of any work in an accessible format, by:

(i) any person to facilitate persons with disability to access to works including sharing with any person with disability of such accessible format for private or personal use, educational purpose or research; or

(ii) any organisation working for the benefit of the persons with disabilities in case the standard format prevents the enjoyment of such works by such persons:

Provided that the copies of the works in such accessible format are made available to the persons with disabilities on a non-profit basis but to recover only the cost of production. Provided further, the organization shall ensure that the copies of works in such accessible format are used only by persons with disabilities and take reasonable steps to prevent entry into ordinary business channels.

 

Recommendations of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce

 

The Parliamentary Standing Committee (“Committee”) constituted under the Dept of Commerce, inter alia, examined the challenges faced in ensuring a balance between copyright protection of the publishers and public access to affordable educational study material in its recent report titled “Report 161: Review of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime in India” presented in the Rajya Sabha on 23rd July 2021.

The Committee observed that the fair use exception is having a detrimental impact on the publishing industry and authors who are mainly dependent on royalties. On the other hand, it also observed that protection of copyrights of publishers and authors which encourages enrichment of quality books and public accessibility of such works at an affordable rate counterbalanced to maintain the overall literary culture and image of the country. Hence, in order to overcome this conflict, the Committee made the following recommendation:

  • Section 52(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 should be amended to facilitate a fair and equitable ecosystem of literary culture in the country by allowing reprographic works in Government-owned educational institutions and storing it in libraries for their easy access to students as well as stipulating limitations to unrestricted commercial grants to copy books and literary works and storage of copied works in digital formats.
  • Libraries should be upgraded to provide easy access to the works of foreign publishers by the students
  • The earliest implementation of National Mission on Libraries (NML), a Government of India initiative to modernize and digitally link close to 9,000 public libraries across the country works.
  • A comprehensive study of the Berne Convention provisions regarding Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to promote a regime of copyright which will be of advantage to both copyright holders and the public.
 

Compulsory License to Reproduce Published Work for the Benefit of Disabled for Profit

 

In addition to the fair dealing exceptions, the Amendment also provides for Compulsory Licensing to any person working for the benefit of the disabled to publish any work on which copyright exists.[1]

Considering the more significant public interest involved in the license proceedings, the Act mandates that Courts shall make necessary endeavors to dispose of such applications within two months from the date of receipt of the application.

 

Reproduction and Cross-border Exchange of Published Works

 

In line with the Treaty’s commitment to make accessible format works available to the beneficiaries across the boundaries, WIPO in June 2014 established the Accessible Books Consortium (“Consortium”). This public-private collaboration brings together all the key players, including the organisers, beneficiaries, publishers, and authors. It is a multiparty collaboration that offers books in an accessible format to blind and prints disabled people across the globe.

As of now, the Consortium holds over six lakhs books in accessible formats in over 80 languages in 93 partnered libraries that are available without legal formalities to the beneficiaries and organisations that assist such people. The Treaty also allows unlocking of Digital Rights Management Amazon Kindle (DRM) book, which can then be reproduced in Braille format and made available to the beneficiaries without the prior consent of the copyright holders.

In India, the Consortium initially covered two states, i.e., Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, by providing support of converting books from standard IX to XII in accessible formats and offering reading assistant devices at a subsidised cost.

The India chapter started with the Daisy Forum of India (“DFI”), which in collaboration with Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), National Institute for Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities (NIEPVD), and the Government of India; launched Sugamya Pustakalaya, India’s first and most significant collection of accessible books hosting over 6.75 lakhs in accessible formats across in as many as 17 languages across DFI libraries.

Since then, multiple NGOs, libraries, Online databases, software programmes have been established. Saksham Trust, a Delhi-based NGO working for the exact cause, is another such organisation.[2] Also, various reading softwares have been developed, such as the INDO-NVDA software, making computers accessible for visually impaired people.

 

Conclusion

 

While India has one of the most progressive copyright exceptions for the benefit of the disabled globally, it is pertinent to note that India hasn’t fully incorporated provisions of the Treaty in her national law. Provisions related to cross-border availability, privacy, and cooperation remain absent. To achieve the objective of the Treaty, it is pertinent that all Contracting Parties comply with their obligations to foster an accessible environment for the disabled.

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Photo by Jaredd Craig on Unsplash

While India has one of the most progressive copyright exceptions for the benefit of the disabled globally, it is pertinent to note that India hasn’t fully incorporated provisions of the Treaty in her national law. Provisions related to cross-border availability, privacy, and cooperation remain absent.

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Development in Indian Copyrights Law in 2019

  • February 19, 2020
  • Avilash Kumbhar

With the digital movement coming of age, the scope of copyright protection has expanded in the past year to a notch higher and effective regulations have been launched to deal with the expansion.

Some of the essential legislation and rulings that shaped the Indian Copyrights law in 2019 are stated hereunder:

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

 

  1. Copyright (Amendment) Rules 2019

The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) vide its press statement dated May 30, 2019 proposed to introduce the Copyright Amendment Rules, 2019[1].  The draft rules aimed at ensuring smooth and flawless compliance of the Copyright Act in the light of technological advancement in the digital era and to bring them in parity with other relevant legislations. They sought to broaden the scope of issuance of statutory licences under section 31-D of the Act for broadcasting work subject to copyright protection by replacing ‘radio and television broadcast’ with ‘each mode of broadcasting’ under rules 29, 30, 31. This amendment came at the backdrop of  Tips Industries Ltd. vs. Wynk Music Ltd. & Anr.[2], where the need to include streaming under the preview of broadcasting was realised under the statutory licensing scheme. The draft also provided for stricter code of conduct for copyright societies and more. 

  1. Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2019

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on Feb 12, 2019 introduced Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill 2019[3] which aims to curb film piracy and imposes stricter penalties and punishments in this accord. The scope of unauthorised use of audio-visual recordings has been widened to include unauthorised camcording and transmission thereof. Strict deterrence can be traced in the proposed bill as intense penal provisions are attracted in the case of making and transmitting copies of a cinematograph film or audio-visual recording without acquiring approval from the owner of such work.

Notable Case Laws

Some of the noteworthy copyright cases for the year 2019 would be:

1.      Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited[4]. 

The Supreme Court of India struck down the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal, and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 framed under the Finance Act, 2017 on the ground that it gave excessive and discretionary powers to the government as to the appointment of service persons to the tribunal and it also affected the judicial independence of the Tribunals. The dilution and encroachment on the judicial domain through the appointment of technical and other members, devoid of either adjudicatory experience or legal knowledge, to the IPAB after the merger of Copyright Board and IPAB was a matter of great concern. However, since this development could not be implemented retrospectively, the appointment already made remained unaffected. 

2.      UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Ors. v. 1337X.TO & Ors[5]

The Delhi High Court introduced a dynamic injunction into Indian jurisdiction to curb online piracy. Through this, Plaintiff could get the order executed against mirror/redirect/alphanumeric websites hosting the same infringing content as those already blocked.

  1. Sajeev Pillai v. Venu Kunnapalli & Anr[6]

It was the case of Plaintiff that the storyline of the defendant’s movie titled Mamankam was the result of the extensive research work done by Plaintiff. Plaintiff had assigned his work which included the story, script, screenplay, and dialogue to the defendant. The Kerala High Court held that the author has a legitimate right to claim authorship even after assignment and the later act does not exhaust the moral right of the author within the meaning of section 57(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957. However, since the movie is the distorted version of the plaintiff’s work due to the mutilation and modification of the original script, the court took a balanced view and allowed the movie to be released without crediting anyone as the author thereof till the final disposal of the suit. 

  1. Tips Industries Ltd. vs. Wynk Music Ltd. & Anr[7]

The Hon’ble Bombay High court interpreted section 31D of the Copyright Act, 1957 as an exception to the copyright laws. It is further stated that statutory licensing extends to only radio and television broadcasting and is exclusive of internet broadcasting. Therefore, online streaming services don’t fall within the ambit of statutory licensing. The flaw could, however, be fixed via the new “Copyright Amendment Rules 2019” stated the Hon’ble court. In the instant case, the defendant’s feature to allow its consumers to download music and store the same for unlimited usage amounted to sale thereby not constituting broadcast stated in 31D of the Copyright act. Therefore, the defendant was not required to avail of a statutory license.

  1. Yash Raj Films v. Sri Sai Ganesh Productions[8]

The plaintiff (Yash Raj) instituted a copyright infringement suit against the defendant for the reproduction of the copyrighted work subsisting in the plaintiff’s movie titled “Band Baja Baraat” through a Telugu remake titled “Jabardasth” without taking prior permission of the plaintiff.    

The Hon’ble High court was of the view that “to make a copy of the film‟ did not mean just to make a physical copy of the film by a process of duplication, but it also referred to another film which substantially, fundamentally, essentially, and materially resembled/reproduced the original film. The defendants had blatantly copied the fundamental, essential and distinctive features as well as forms and expression of the plaintiff’s film on purpose and consequently, infringed the plaintiff’s copyright.

  1. Raj Rewal v. Union of India & Ors[9]

The Hon’ble Delhi High court in the instant case dealt with a significant question of copyright law i.e., whether an author’s (architect’s) rights foreshadow the rights of the property owner. It was answered in the negative, i.e. the property owner’s right as per constitutional right under Article 300A shall be held more vital and that he/she can choose to destruct or modify the building on his/her property. Therefore, the Owner’s right shall precede the Author’s right under Sec 57 of the Copyright Act.

  1. Thiagarajan Kumararaja v. M/s Capital Film Works and Anr[10]

The Hon’ble Madras High Court for the first time deliberated a ruling on rights of the producer qua the author of the script with regard to the dubbing of the film and held that the producer of the film has the right to dub the film in any other language provided there isn’t any agreement to the contrary. Under Section 2(d)(v) in relation to a cinematograph film, the producer is the author and since they had taken the initiative and the responsibility for making the work i.e., cinematograph film, they had the right to dub the same. Accordingly, the infringement suit for dubbing the film in another language was dismissed and decided in favour of the producer.

 

CONCLUSION

From defending the right of the producer to dub in other languages, to continuance of the moral right of the author even after the assignment of work, it can be said that the year 2019 has been a busy year for the music and film industry. The introduction of the dynamic injunction against rogue websites was a much-needed change for the empowerment of lawful owners of copyrighted work to battle piracy. Further, the online copyright application system has progressively become filer-friendly in the past year[11]. In addition, increased transparency and stakeholder participation has created a protective environment for enhanced copyright preservation.

References 

[1] Available at http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/pdfgazette.pdf

[2] Commercial Suit IP (L) No. 114 of 2018

[3] https://prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill_files/Cinematograph%20%28A%29%20Bill%2C%202019.pdf

[4]  Civil Appeal No. 8588 of 2019, SLP No. No.15804 of 2017

[5] CS(COMM) 724/2017

[6] FAO.No.191 OF 2019

[7] Commercial Suit IP (L) No. 114 of 2018

[8] CS (COMM) 1329/2016

[9] CS (Comm) No. 3 of 2018

[10] Original Side Appeal No. 22 of 2017

[11] http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAnnualReport/1_110_1_Annual_Report_2017-18_English.pd


Image Credits: Noor Younis on Unsplash

From defending the right of the producer to dub in other languages, to continuance of the moral right of the author even after the assignment of work, it can be said that the year 2019 has been a busy year for the music and film industry. The introduction of the dynamic injunction against rogue websites was a much-needed change for the empowerment of lawful owners of copyrighted work to battle piracy.

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